Do underwriters compete in IPO pricing? by LYANDRES, Evgeny et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
2-2018
Do underwriters compete in IPO pricing?
Evgeny LYANDRES
Boston University
Fangjian FU
Singapore Management University, fjfu@smu.edu.sg
Erica X. N. LI
Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2587
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LYANDRES, Evgeny; FU, Fangjian; and LI, Erica X. N.. Do underwriters compete in IPO pricing?. (2018). Management Science. 64,
(2), 925-954. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4425
Do Underwriters Compete in IPO pricing?∗
Evgeny Lyandres†, Fangjian Fu‡, Erica X. N. Li§
April 2016
Abstract
We propose and implement a direct test of the hypothesis of oligopolistic competition
in the U.S. underwriting market against the alternative of implicit collusion among under-
writers. We construct a simple model of interaction between heterogenous underwriters and
heterogenous firms and solve it under two alternative assumptions: oligopolistic competition
among underwriters and implicit collusion among them. The two solutions lead to different
equilibrium relations between the compensation of underwriters of different quality on one
hand and the time-varying demand for public incorporation on the other hand. Our empir-
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1 Introduction
The U.S. IPO underwriting market is highly profitable. IPO gross spreads, most of which
cluster at 7%, seem high in absolute terms and are high relative to other countries (e.g., Chen
and Ritter (2000), Torstila (2003), Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), and Kang and
Lowery (2014)). In addition, returns on IPO stocks on the first day of trading (i.e. IPO
underpricing) tend to be even higher than underwriting spreads (e.g., Loughran, Ritter and
Rydqvist (1994), Ritter and Welch (2002), Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002), and Ljungqvist
and Wilhelm (2003)). The allocation of IPO shares is at the discretion of the underwriters, which
are rewarded by investors, who benefit from high first-day returns. The indirect compensation
of the underwriters typically takes the form of “soft” dollars, such as abnormally high trading
commissions (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2004), Reuter (2006), Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang
(2007), and Goldstein, Irvine and Puckett (2011)), spinning (e.g., Liu and Ritter (2010)), and
laddering (e.g., Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2007) and Hao (2007)).
There is an ongoing debate as to whether the high profitability of the U.S. IPO underwriting
market is suggestive of implicit collusion in price setting among underwriters – i.e. a situation
in which underwriters take into account the externalities that their underwriting spreads and
IPO pricing impose on other banks – or, alternatively, of oligopolistic competition among un-
derwriters. On one side of the debate, Chen and Ritter (2000) show that IPO underwriting
spreads in the U.S. cluster at 7% and argue that the U.S. IPO underwriting market is likely
to be characterized by “strategic price setting” (i.e. implicit collusion). Similarly, Abraham-
son, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) find no evidence that the high gross spreads in the U.S. can
be justified by non-collusive reasons, such as legal expenses, retail distribution costs, litigation
risk, high cost of research analysts, and the possibility that higher fees may be offset by lower
underpricing.
On the other side of the debate, Hansen (2001) finds that the U.S. IPO underwriting market
is characterized by low concentration and high degree of entry, that IPO spreads did not decline
following the SEC announcements of allegations of collusion, and that the underwriting spreads
of IPOs that do not belong to the 7% cluster are typically higher than 7%. He interprets this
evidence as suggesting that investment banks may still compete for IPO underwriting business
on dimensions other than pricing, for example, underwriter prestige (e.g., Beatty and Ritter
(1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)), analyst coverage
and investment recommendations (e.g., Dunbar (2000), Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001),
Cliff and Denis (2004), and Liu and Ritter (2011)), and aftermarket price support (e.g., Ellis,
Michaely and O’Hara (2000) and Lewellen (2006)).
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In this paper we contribute to this debate by proposing and implementing new tests of the
hypotheses of oligopolistic competition versus implicit collusion in price setting in the U.S. IPO
underwriting market. Our strategy consists of two steps. First, we construct a model of the
IPO underwriting market and solve it under two distinct assumptions regarding the competitive
structure of the market. In the first setting, characterized by oligopolistic competition, we
assume that each underwriter sets the price for its services with the objective of maximizing its
own expected profit, while taking into account the optimal responses of other underwriters. In
the second setting, characterized by implicit collusion, we assume that underwriters cooperate
in price setting, i.e. they choose underwriting fees and set IPO offer prices with the goal of
maximizing their joint expected profit.
Both solutions of the model yield equilibrium relations between the proportional and abso-
lute (dollar) compensation of higher-quality and lower-quality underwriters on one hand and
firms’ demand for public incorporation on the other hand. The comparative statics obtained
in the oligopolistic competition setting are, in many cases, different from those obtained in
the implicit collusion setting. We are agnostic ex-ante regarding the structure of the market
and, therefore, our tests do not favor either of the two hypotheses. It is important to note
that our term “implicit collusion” refers to internalization by banks of the effects of their IPO
pricing and underwriting spreads on other underwriters, and does not preclude the possibility
that underwriters compete for IPO business via other channels such as providing (star) analyst
coverage and/or aftermarket price support, getting access to favorable investor clientele, etc.
Our second step is to employ U.S. IPO data during the period 1975–2013 to test predictions
that follow from the two versions of the model and examine whether oligopolistic competition or
implicit collusion fits the data better. Our exercise is in the spirit of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), who solve an industry equilibrium model under the collusion scenario and, alternatively,
under the competitive scenario, and examine empirically which of the two settings fits more
closely the effects of U.S. military spending on the economy. While most of the literature
examining potential collusion in the IPO underwriting market focuses on the direct component
of underwriter compensation (IPO spreads), Kang and Lowery (2014) demonstrate that it is
crucial to also account for the indirect component of banks’ compensation (IPO underpricing)
in an analysis of IPO market structure. Thus, in our empirical tests, we account for both IPO
spreads and underpricing in estimating underwriter compensation.
Our model features investment banks of heterogenous quality that provide underwriting ser-
vices to heterogeneous firms: Higher-quality underwriters provide higher value-added to firms
whose IPOs they underwrite. Providing underwriting services entails costs, which depend both
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on the volume of underwritten IPOs and on the demand for public incorporation. Firms choose
whether to go public or stay private and, in case they decide to go public, which underwriter to
employ for their IPO, with the objective of maximizing the benefits of being public net of IPO
costs. The resulting equilibrium outcome is similar to that in Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt
(2005) – an assortative matching of firms and underwriters: Higher-quality underwriters charge
higher fees; firms with relatively high valuations employ higher-quality underwriters; medium-
valued firms are taken public by lower-quality underwriters; and low-valued firms stay private,
since for them the costs of going public outweigh the benefits of public incorporation. Unlike
Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) and Liu and Ritter (2011), who assume oligopolistic com-
petition among underwriters, we solve our model twice: first, under the oligopolistic competition
scenario, and, second, under the implicit collusion scenario.
The model’s main comparative statics are as follows. First, in the oligopolistic competi-
tion scenario, the mean equilibrium proportional underwriter compensation (i.e. compensation
relative to IPO proceeds) is predicted to be increasing in the demand for public incorporation
for both higher-quality and lower-quality underwriters, because banks are more selective in the
choice of IPO firms when the demand for going public is high. This selectivity leads to higher
average value of IPO firms going public when the demand for public incorporation is higher,
empowering underwriters to charge higher (direct and indirect) fees.
In the collusive setting, the relation between the mean proportional underwriter compensa-
tion and the demand for public incorporation is positive for higher-quality banks, for reasons
similar to those in the competitive case. On the other hand, the relation is U-shaped for lower-
quality underwriters. The reason for the decreasing part of the relation is that when the demand
for public incorporation is low, it is in the banks’ combined interest to set relatively high fees
for lower-quality banks. This pricing strategy effectively results in channeling most IPOs to
higher-quality banks. When the demand for public incorporation is high, on the other hand,
both higher-quality and lower-quality banks underwrite larger IPOs, enabling them to demand
higher compensation.
Second, in the oligopolistic competition scenario, the ratio of mean equilibrium dollar com-
pensation received by higher-quality underwriters to that received by lower-quality underwriters
is predicted to be decreasing in the demand for public incorporation. The reason is that in cold
markets, lower-quality underwriters have to set fees that are significantly lower than those
of higher-quality underwriters to get some share of the underwriting business. This relative
difference declines, however, as the demand for public incorporation increases.
In the collusive scenario, the relation between the ratio of mean dollar compensation charged
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by higher-quality banks to that charged by lower-quality banks on one hand and the demand
for public incorporation on the other hand is shown to be hump-shaped. The reason is that
when the demand for going public is low, underwriters’ joint profit is maximized by channelling
most IPOs to the higher-quality banks. To achieve this, the colluding banks choose high fees for
lower-quality banks relative to those of higher-quality ones. However, the incentive to channel
IPOs to higher-quality banks weakens as the demand for public incorporation increases, because
of increasing marginal costs of underwriting. This explains the increasing portion of the hump-
shaped relation between the ratio of dollar compensation charged by higher-quality banks to
that charged by lower-quality banks on one hand and the demand for public incorporation on the
other hand. As the demand for IPO underwriting services keeps increasing, both higher-quality
and lower-quality banks underwrite higher-valued IPOs, reducing the differences between the
sizes of IPOs underwritten by banks of different quality and between the absolute (dollar)
compensation they receive in equilibrium. In other words, the stronger the demand for public
incorporation, the weaker the effect of one bank’s compensation on the demand for another
bank’s underwriting services, and the lower the banks’ incentives to collude. This explains the
decreasing portion of the hump-shaped relation.
Our empirical results are generally in line with the implicit collusion model and are less sup-
portive of the oligopolistic competition model. First, consistent with the former and inconsistent
with the latter, the mean proportional compensation of lower-quality underwriters exhibits a
U-shaped relation with the demand for public incorporation, both when we focus exclusively on
the direct component of underwriter compensation, i.e. underwriting spread, and also when we
account for its potential indirect component, i.e. kickbacks to underwriters due to underpricing.
Second, the relation between the ratio of higher-quality banks’ compensation for underwriting
services to that of lower-quality banks’ compensation on one hand and the demand for public
incorporation on the other hand is hump-shaped. This relation is significant both economically
and statistically, and robust to various definitions of higher-quality and lower-quality under-
writers. However, our results suggest that implicit collusion, if present, is not likely to take
the form of perfect price discrimination. The reason is that comparative statics following from
a model of perfect price discrimination are very different from the model of implicit collusion
analyzed in this paper, in which underwriters pseudo-compete on price by setting IPO fees and
pricing to achieve optimal allocation of IPOs.
Consistent with an extension of the model in which we examine a conceivable situation in
which only a subset of larger, more reputable underwriters consider coordinating IPO fees, the
empirical relations discussed above hold when we restrict the sample to underwriters with the
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highest reputation. This is consistent with implicit collusion being more plausible among large
banks, which are less interested in coordinating prices with their fringe rivals. Also, the empirical
results are not driven by underwriter syndication (i.e. IPOs with multiple book runners), which
has become especially prevalent in recent years. In particular, the results generally hold in the
pre–2000 subsample, in which syndication is rare, and are robust to performing the tests on a
sample of only lead book runners.
The static nature of our model, coupled with time-series empirical predictions, is a potential
limitation of our setting. In a dynamic setting, underwriters’ incentives to collude may be time-
varying. In particular, since the benefits of deviating from implicit collusion are higher when the
demand for public incorporation is high (e.g, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1992)), it is possible that underwriters would implicitly collude in times of
relatively low demand for going public and compete in times of relatively high demand. As
the comparative statics of the collusive and competitive models differ mostly when the demand
for public incorporation is relatively low, our evidence can be interpreted as consistent with a
dynamic setting in which underwriters tend to engage in implicit collusion in price setting when
the demand for their services is low.
To summarize, our paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we propose novel tests of the hy-
pothesis of oligopolistic competition in the U.S. IPO underwriting market against the alternative
hypothesis of implicit collusion in setting IPO underwriting spreads and offer prices. Our tests
are based on matching the directional predictions derived from two versions of a model of inter-
action between heterogenous underwriters and heterogenous firms – one in which underwriters
compete in IPO pricing and the other in which they cooperate – to the relations observed in
the data. Second, our empirical findings contribute to the debate regarding the structure of the
U.S. IPO underwriting market. Our results are more consistent with the hypothesis of implicit
collusion among underwriters in IPO price setting. This is in line with recent studies (e.g.,
Liu and Ritter (2011)), which suggest that by providing analyst coverage and/or aftermarket
support, underwriters compete less fiercely on the IPO pricing dimension.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model and its solution under
two scenarios: oligopolistic competition and implicit collusion, and derives two sets of empirical
predictions. In Section 3 we conduct empirical tests of these predictions. Section 4 concludes.
Appendix A provides proofs of theoretical results. Appendices B, C, and D contain extensions
of the baseline model.
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2 Model
In this section we first set up a simple model of interaction between two heterogenous under-
writers on one hand and a mass of heterogenous firms that are considering going public on the
other hand. We solve the model under two distinct scenarios. The first is oligopolistic compe-
tition, in which underwriters set their compensation non-cooperatively, and each underwriter
maximizes its profit without internalizing the effects of its decisions on the other underwriter’s
profit. The second scenario is implicit collusion, in which the two underwriters make their
decisions cooperatively, with the objective of maximizing their combined profit.
2.1 Setup
There is a mass of firms of size N , which are initially private. These firms are considering going
public because their values would be higher under public incorporation. The firms trade off the
net benefits of public incorporation versus the costs of an IPO. In what follows, we refer to N
as “the demand for public incorporation”. Private firms’ values are assumed to be distributed
uniformly between zero and one:
Vi ∼ U(0, 1], (1)
where Vi is firm i’s pre-IPO value.
Each firm may decide to go public or to stay private, and firms make these decisions simulta-
neously and non-cooperatively. A firm’s IPO needs to be underwritten by a bank (underwriter).
We assume that there are two banks, denoted B1 and B2. Going public has benefits, which
we assume to be described by underwriter-specific value-added parameters, αj for bank j. We
assume, without loss of generality, that α1 > α2 > 0 and refer to B1 and B2 as “higher-quality”
and “lower-quality” underwriters respectively. Going public is costly: the fee charged by bank
j for underwriting firm i’s IPO is Fi,j . If a firm with pre-IPO value Vi decides to go public using
underwriter j, its post-IPO value, Vi,j , equals
Vi,j = Vi(1 + αj)− Fi,j . (2)
Firm i decides to go public using underwriter j if its post-IPO value, Vi,j , net of underwriting
fee, Fi,j , exceeds both its pre-IPO value and its value following IPO underwritten by the other
bank net of that bank’s fee.
We assume that each bank charges a flat fee for underwriting an IPO, Fi,j = λj , which is
chosen after observing the demand for public incorporation, N , and the distribution of firms’
pre-IPO values. In what follows, we use the terms “underwriter fee” and “underwriter compen-
sation” interchangeably.
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For a given level of demand for public incorporation, N , banks face increasing marginal
costs of providing underwriting services. In addition, the costs of underwriting a given mass of
IPOs are assumed to be decreasing in the demand for public incorporation. In particular, for
underwriter j, the total cost of underwriting Nj IPOs, TCj(Nj , N), is
TCj(Nj , N) =
cj
Nk
N2j , (3)
where cj is underwriter-specific and 0 ≤ k < 1.
2.2 Discussion of assumptions
IPO as a method of obtaining public incorporation
Since the focus of this paper is on the structure of the IPO underwriting market, in the model
we assume that in order for a firm to become publicy-traded, it has to conduct an IPO. However,
in reality, there is another viable “exit” choice – a private firm can be acquired by a publicly-
traded one (e.g., Brau, Francis and Kohers (2003), Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008), Bayar and
Chemmanur (2012), and Chemmanur, He, He and Nandy (2015)). In the empirical analysis we
account for acquisitions of private firms by public ones as well as for IPOs in constructing a
measure of the demand for public incorporation.
Mass of firms
We treat the total number of firms that are considering going public, N , and the number of firms
that decide to have their IPOs underwritten by a particular bank j, Nj , as continuous variables,
i.e. we consider masses of firms. In doing so, we follow a large body of industrial organization
literature (e.g., Ruffin (1971), Okuguchi (1973), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Loury (1979), von
Weizsa¨cker (1980), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986)). Seade (1980) justifies the practice of
treating the number of firms as a continuous variable by arguing that it is always possible to use
continuous differentiable variables and restrict attention to integer realizations of these variables.
Distribution of firm values
The assumption that firm values are distributed uniformly on the interval (0, 1] is made for
analytical convenience. The intuition for the model’s results and comparative statics does not
depend on the particular distribution of firm values.
Two underwriters
The assumption that there are two underwriters is made for analytical convenience. While it
is possible to obtain an analytical solution to a model with any number of underwriters, the
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equilibrium quantities become algebra-intensive when the number of underwriters exceeds two,
to the extent that makes it impossible to analyze the model’s comparative statics analytically.
In Appendix B, we examine the case of three underwriters (all, none, or part of which may
collude in setting their fees) and show that the model’s quantitative results are robust to the
case of three underwriters.
IPO value added and IPO size
Public incorporation has numerous benefits, as well as costs. The dollar value of many of the
benefits of public incorporation, such as lower cost of capital, following from improved liquid-
ity (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986)), improved operating and investment decision making
(e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Shah and Thakor (1988), and Chod and Lyandres (2011)),
and improved mergers and acquisitions policy (e.g., Zingales (1995) and Hsieh, Lyandres, and
Zhdanov (2010)), is likely to be increasing in firm size. While there are other benefits of public
incorporation whose value is not necessarily larger for larger firms, such as outside monitoring
(e.g., Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993)), loosening of financial constraints (e.g., Hsu, Reed, and
Rocholl (2010)), certification (Lee and Wahal (2004)), and favorable analyst coverage (e.g.,
James and Karceski (2006)), the overall dollar benefits of public incorporation are likely to be
positively related to the size of the firm going public, hence the assumption that the value added
of an IPO is proportional to firm size.
Heterogeneous underwriter quality
Underwriters’ value added can take various forms, such as reputation, certification, and/or ana-
lyst coverage provision (e.g., Liu and Ritter (2011)). Alternatively, the value added may be due
to underwriters’ marketing and distribution networks (e.g., Biais, Bossaerts and Rochet (2002)).
We assume that underwriters are heterogeneous in their quality, i.e. in the value they add to
the firms whose IPOs they underwrite. Higher-quality underwriters may have an advantage at
marketing an issue through a road show, selling an issue to longer-term investors, stabilizing
stock prices in the aftermarket, and providing analyst coverage of a newly issued stock. Empir-
ically, underwriter quality is positively related to post-IPO long-run performance (e.g., Nanda
and Yun (1995) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Dong, Michel and Pandes (2011))).
The assumption of heterogenous underwriter quality is crucial for the model’s solution, as it is
based on assortative matching of firms and underwriters in equilibrium.
Flat underwriter compensation
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The assumption that underwriter compensation is flat, i.e. dependent on the identity of the
underwriter but not on the size of the firm that is going public is made for analytical conve-
nience, since a model in which underwriter fees depend on firm size does not have analytical
solutions. However, this assumption is inconsistent with empirical evidence that suggests that
underwriter compensation has both fixed and variable components (e.g., Altinkilic¸ and Hansen
(2000)). To examine whether this assumption drives the model’s results, in Appendix C we
solve numerically a generalized version of the model, in which we assume that underwriter com-
pensation has two components: a fixed fee, λj , which is identical for all firms underwritten by
bank j, and a variable component, µjVi, which increases in the size of the firm going public.
We show that the results of the generalized model with variable IPO fees are consistent with
the baseline model with flat IPO fees, solved analytically.
IPO spreads and kickbacks considered together
Underwriter compensation consists of two components. The first, direct, component is the fee
paid by the issuing firm to its IPO underwriter (i.e. IPO spread). The second, indirect, com-
ponent is the money left on the table at the time of the IPO (i.e. IPO underpricing), part of
which is argued to accrue to underwriters (e.g., Reuter (2006), Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang
(2007), and Goldstein, Irvine and Puckett (2011)). In the model, we refer to all the (direct
and indirect) compensation a bank receives in exchange for providing underwriting services as
underwriter fee (or IPO fee). In reality, these two components of underwriter compensation are
decided at different times: underwriting spread is determined during the process of a search for
an underwriter (“beauty contest”), while underpricing is determined after the underwriter has
been chosen. We assume that the two components of underwriter compensation are set simulta-
neously in order to construct the most parsimonious model of interaction between heterogenous
firms and heterogenous underwriters. Simultaneous determination of the two components of
underwriter compensation assumes away information asymmetries between firms, underwriters,
and investors during the IPO process. In the absence of information asymmetries, all players
can compute the total transfers between firms and underwriters, regardless of the form these
transfers take. This simplification allows us to focus on the overall compensation received by
underwriters.
Marginal costs of underwriting
Our specification of the costs of underwriting IPOs captures two effects. First, conditional on
the demand for public incorporation, the total costs of underwriting for a given bank are likely
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convex in the mass of underwritten IPOs, i.e. the marginal costs of underwriting are increasing
in the mass of IPOs that bank j underwrites (Nj) for a given demand for public incorporation
(N). This assumption is consistent with Khanna, Noe and Sonti’s (2008) model of inelastic
supply of labor in investment banking, with empirical estimates of underwriters’ cost function
(e.g., Altinkilic¸ and Hansen (2000)), and with empirical evidence in Lowry and Schwert (2002),
who find that when the demand for public incorporation is high, investment banks struggle to
provide service to all firms interested in going public. The assumption of increasing marginal
costs of underwriting is crucial as it ensures that both banks underwrite a positive mass of IPOs
in equilibrium.
Second, the marginal costs of underwriting a given mass of IPOs are decreasing in the
demand for public incorporation, N , as marketing and/or distribution costs are likely to be
lower when the demand for public incorporation is high. However, this assumption is not crucial
to any of the results, which continue to hold in the limiting case of the costs of underwriting
being independent of the demand for public incorporation (k = 0).
The assumption that the negative relation between the total cost of underwriting and the
demand for public incorporation is weaker than multiplicative inverse (k < 1) is made for
analytical convenience. This assumption results in a positive relation between the marginal
cost of underwriting the last IPO in a given range of values of firms going public and the
demand for public incorporation, N . Without this assumption (i.e. if k would equal or exceed
one), a corner solution would be reached for sufficiently large N , in which all firms considering
going public would conduct an IPO and have it underwritten by one bank. The assumption
k < 1 precludes the possibility of this corner solution, which simplifies the model considerably.
Third, we assume that underwriters are potentially heterogenous in their cost functions.
This assumption does not drive any of the results, which hold in the limiting case of identical
cost functions of the two underwriters.
2.3 Underwriters’ objective functions
Assume first that the underwriting market is competitive in the sense that the two banks
set their underwriting fees simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Each bank’s objective is to
maximize its own profit, pij for bank j, while taking into account the optimal response of the
other underwriter.
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We can write bank j’s optimization problem as
pij = max
λj
(
λjN
∗
j (λj , λ−j , N)−
cj
Nk
(
N∗j (λj , λ−j , N)
)2)
=
max
λj
(
λjN
∫ 1
i=0
I∗i,jdi −
cj
Nk
(
N
∫ 1
i=0
I∗i,jdi
)2)
, (4)
where N∗j (λj , λ−j , N) is the equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by bank j as a function of
its own fee, λj , the other bank’s fee, λ−j , and the demand for public incorporation, N ; and I∗i,j
is an indicator that equals one if bank j underwrites the IPO of a firm with pre-IPO value Vi
in equilibrium and equals zero otherwise.
Assume now that the underwriting market is collusive in the sense that the two banks
coordinate their fees, i.e. they set their fees with the objective of maximizing their combined
profit, pijoint = pi1 + pi2. The banks’ joint optimization problem becomes
pijoint = max
λ1,λ2
 2∑
j=1
(
λjN
∗
j (λj , λ−j , N)−
cj
Nk
(
N∗j (λj , λ−j , N)
)2) =
max
λ1,λ2
 2∑
j=1
(
λjN
∫ 1
i=0
I∗i,jdi −
cj
Nk
(
N
∫ 1
i=0
I∗i,jdi
)2) . (5)
2.4 Firms’ strategies
After observing the fees charged by the two underwriters, each firm can pursue one of three
mutually exclusive strategies: it can remain private or it can perform an IPO underwritten by
one of the two banks. Firm i’s maximized value, V ∗i , is thus
V ∗i = sup{Vi, Vi(1 + α1)− λ1, Vi(1 + α2)− λ2}. (6)
It follows from (6) that each firm’s optimal strategy can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 Firm i’s optimal strategy as a function of the two underwriters’ value-added param-
eters, α1 and α2, and of their underwriting fees, λ1 and λ2, is as follows:
1) If λ1α1 >
λ2
α2
then
perform an IPO underwritten by B1 if Vi >
λ1 − λ2
α1 − α2 ,
perform an IPO underwritten by B2 if
λ2
α2
< Vi ≤ λ1 − λ2
α1 − α2 ,
remain private if Vi ≤ λ2
α2
.
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2) If λ1α1 ≤ λ2α2 then
perform an IPO underwritten by B1 if Vi >
λ1
α1
,
remain private if Vi ≤ λ1
α1
.
As a result, depending on the fees set by the two banks, the following situations are possible.
1) No IPOs. This happens if λ1α1 ≥ 1 and λ2α2 ≥ 1.
2) No IPOs underwritten by B1. B2 underwrites IPOs of firms with Vi >
λ2
α2
. This happens if
λ2
α2
< 1 ≤ λ1α1 .
3) No IPOs underwritten by B2. B1 underwrites IPOs of firms with Vi >
λ1
α1
. This happens if
λ1
α1
≤ λ2α2 and λ1α1 < 1.
4) B2 underwrites IPOs of firms with Vi ∈ (λ2α2 , λ1−λ2α1−α2 ]. B1 underwrites IPOs of firms with
Vi >
λ1−λ2
α1−α2 . This happens if
λ2
α2
< λ1α1 and
λ1−λ2
α1−α2 < 1.
The first case above is trivial. If the fees charged by both banks are too high to induce
even the highest-valued firm (which would benefit the most from an IPO) to go public, then
no firm would choose to do an IPO. In the second scenario, the higher-quality bank’s (B1) fee
is too high; therefore even the most valuable firm, which could benefit the most from its IPO
being underwritten by B1, prefers to have its IPO underwritten by the lower-quality bank (B2)
despite the lower value increase brought by B2. In the third case, the benefit of an IPO with B1
net of its underwriting fee exceeds the net benefit of an IPO with B2 even for the least valuable
firm that would still benefit from an IPO with B2. Therefore, all IPOs are underwritten by B1.
Finally, in the fourth case, both banks underwrite IPOs: B1 underwrites IPOs of companies
whose valuations are sufficiently high, so that the higher benefit of an IPO underwritten by B1
outweighs its higher fee, while IPOs of firms with lower valuations (that are still sufficiently
high to go through an IPO with B2) are underwritten by B2.
The next result establishes that in both the oligopolistic competition scenario and the im-
plicit collusion scenario, in equilibrium, only the fourth case, in which both banks underwrite
some IPOs, is possible.
Lemma 2 In both the oligopolistic competition and implicit collusion scenarios, equilibrium
underwriters’ fees satisfy
λ∗2
α2
<
λ∗1
α1
and
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 < 1. Firms with values Vi ≤
λ∗2
α2
remain private.
Firms with values
λ∗2
α2
< Vi ≤ λ
∗
1−λ∗2
α1−α2 go public and have their IPOs underwritten by B2. Firms
with values Vi >
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 go public and have their IPOs underwritten by B1.
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The marginal cost of underwriting the first IPO (i.e. the first “infinitesimal unit of IPO”,
as we treat the number of firms going public as a continuous variable) approaches zero. In the
oligopolistic competition case, in which each bank sets its underwriting fee without accounting
for the externality that its fee imposes on the other underwriter, each bank always prefers
underwriting the first IPO at any fee greater than zero to underwriting no IPOs, which results
in both banks underwriting positive masses of IPOs in equilibrium.
In the collusive case, in which the banks set their fees jointly, it is also always advantageous
to have each bank underwrite a strictly positive mass of IPOs. The reason is as follows. Even if
the two banks’ combined revenue is maximized when all IPOs are underwritten by the higher-
quality bank, moving the last infinitesimal unit of underwritten IPO to the lower-quality bank
has a negligible (negative) effect on the combined revenue, since the higher-quality bank can
charge slightly higher fees for all other IPOs it underwrites. On the other hand, having the last
unit of IPO underwritten by the lower-quality bank reduces the banks’ combined underwriting
costs, as the marginal cost of underwriting the first IPO by the lower-quality bank approaches
zero, while the marginal cost of underwriting the last unit of IPO by the higher-quality bank
is strictly positive. Thus, having the last unit of IPO underwritten by the lower-quality bank
reduces the two banks’ combined revenues by a lower amount than the reduction in the two
banks combined underwriting costs. As a result, both banks underwrite some IPOs in the
collusive equilibrium.
To summarize, in equilibrium, underwriting fees are set in such a way that each bank gets
a positive share of the IPO underwriting market, in both competitive and collusive equilibria.
Highest-valued firms’ IPOs are underwritten by the higher-quality bank, lower-valued firms’
IPOs are underwritten by the lower-quality bank, whereas lowest-valued firms stay private. This
outcome is consistent with anecdotal evidence that suggests that more reputable banks tend
to underwrite larger IPOs, with Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt’s (2005) assortative matching
model of firms and underwriters, in which firm quality and underwriter quality are positively
correlated, and with recent evidence of assortative matching in the IPO market (e.g., Akkus,
Cookson and Hortacsu (2015)) and in the private investment in public equity (PIPE) market
(e.g., Dai, Jo and Schatzberg (2010)). More generally, this matching is consistent with the
efficient rationing rule (e.g., Tirole (1988)).
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2.5 Equilibrium underwriter fees and profits
2.5.1 Oligopolistic competition
Using the result in Lemma 2, we can rewrite bank j’s optimization problem in (4) as
pij = max
λj
(
λj
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))
− cj
Nk
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))2)
, (7)
V1 =
λ1 − λ2
α1 − α2 and V1 = 1, (8)
V2 =
λ2
α2
and V2 =
λ1 − λ2
α1 − α2 , (9)
where the mass of IPOs underwritten by bank j, Nj = N
(
Vj − Vj
)
, is determined by the two
“indifference thresholds ”: V1 = V2 determines the value of the marginal firm that is indifferent
between having its IPO underwritten by B1 or B2, and V2 determines the value of the marginal
firm that is indifferent between having its IPO underwritten by B2 and staying private. Solving
the system of two first-order conditions that follow from (7) results in equilibrium fee level of
each bank under the oligopolistic competition scenario, λ∗jComp for bank j:
1,2
λ∗1Comp =
2α1
(
2Nc1 +N
k (α1 − α2)
) (
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)
ΦComp
, (10)
λ∗2Comp =
α2
(
2Nc1 +N
k (α1 − α2)
) (
2Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)
ΦComp
, (11)
where
ΦComp = 2Nc1
(
2Nc2α1 +N
k (2α1 − α2)α2
)
+Nk
(
2Nc2α1 (2α1 − α2) +Nkα2
(
4α21 − 5α1α2 + α22
))
.
The equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by each of the two banks, N∗1Comp and N
∗
2Comp
, are
N∗1Comp =
N1+kα1
(
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)
ΦComp
, (12)
N∗2Comp =
N1+kα1α2
(
Nc1 +N
k (α1 − α2)
)
ΦComp
. (13)
Finally, the equilibrium profits of the two underwriters, pi∗1Comp and pi
∗
2Comp
, are
pi∗1Comp =
4N1+kα21
(
Nc1 +N
k (α1 − α2)
) (
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)2
Φ2Comp
, (14)
pi∗2Comp =
N1+kα1α
2
2
(
2Nc1 +N
k (α1 − α2)
)2 (
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)
Φ2Comp
. (15)
1We verify that in both the oligopolistic competition scenario and in the implicit collusion scenario, the second
derivatives of underwriters’ profits with respect to their compensation are negative.
2We verify that in both the oligopolistic competition scenario and the implicit collusion scenario, the equilib-
rium conditions
λ∗2
α2
<
λ∗1
α1
and
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 < 1 are satisfied.
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2.5.2 Implicit collusion
Using the result in Lemma 2, we can rewrite the two banks’ joint optimization problem in (5)
as
pijoint = max
λ1,λ2
 2∑
j=1
(
λj
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))
− cj
Nk
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))2) , (16)
where Vj and Vj for the two banks are given in (8) and (9), respectively. Solving the system
of two first-order conditions that follow from (16) results in equilibrium fees under the implicit
collusion scenario, λ∗jColl for bank j:
λ∗1Coll =
Nkα1
(
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)
+Nc1
(
2Nc2α1 +N
k (2α1 − α2)α2
)
ΦColl
, (17)
λ∗2Coll =
α2
(
Nc1
(
2Nc2 +N
kα2
)
+Nk
(
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
))
ΦColl
, (18)
where
ΦColl = 2
(
Nc1
(
Nc2 +N
kα2
)
+Nk
(
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
))
.
The equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by each of the two banks, N∗1Coll and N
∗
2Coll
, are
N∗1Coll =
N2+kc1α
2
2
2ΦColl
, (19)
N∗2Coll =
N1+k
(
Nc2α1 +N
k (α1 − α2)α2
)
ΦColl
, (20)
and the equilibrium combined profit of the two banks, pi∗jointColl ,
pi∗jointColl =
N1+k
(
N
(
c1α
2
2 + c2α
2
1
)
+Nk (α1 − α2)α1α2
)
2ΦColl
. (21)
After having derived the underwriters’ equilibrium profits in the oligopolistic competition
and implicit collusion scenarios, we compare them in order to verify that the underwriters do
not have incentives to deviate from the collusive outcome in our static framework.3
Lemma 3 The equilibrium combined underwriter profit in the implicit collusion scenario, pi∗jointColl,
is larger than the sum of the underwriters’ profits in the oligopolistic competition scenario,
pi∗1Comp + pi
∗
2Comp
.
3We implicitly allow the possibility of transfers among underwriters in the case of implicit collusion between
them. Without such transfers, it would be optimal for the lower-quality underwriter to deviate from the collusive
outcome when the demand for public incorporation is sufficiently low.
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2.6 Underwriter compensation, IPO size, and underwriter quality
Before proceeding to analyze the relation between the demand for public incorporation and
the equilibrium underwriting fees of the two banks, we examine cross-sectional determinants of
underwriting fees. In other words, we compare equilibrium IPO fees paid by firms of different
sizes and firms whose IPOs are underwritten by underwriters of different quality. The results
of these comparisons are summarized in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4 In both the competitive and collusive scenarios, the equilibrium proportional under-
writing fee for all IPOs underwritten by bank j,
λ∗j
Vi
, is decreasing in IPO size, Vi.
This result follows immediately from the assumption that a given bank’s IPO fee is constant
for all firms whose IPOs it underwrites. Lemma 4 is consistent with existing empirical evidence
that proportional underwriting fee tends to be decreasing in IPO size (e.g., Ritter (1987), Beatty
and Welch (1996), and Torstila (2003)), which we confirm in unreported tests using our data.
To examine the relation between the quality of an underwriter and its equilibrium compen-
sation, we define the weighted average proportional fee of bank j as the ratio of the combined
fees collected by bank j from all firms whose IPOs it underwrites to combined pre-IPO value of
these firms:
Definition 1 The weighted average proportional underwriting fee of bank j, RFj, is
RFj =
λ∗j
(
Vj − Vj
)
Vj∫
V=Vj
V dV
. (22)
The next result establishes the relation between the underwriters’ weighted average proportional
fee and their quality.
Lemma 5 In both the competitive and collusive scenarios, the equilibrium weighted average pro-
portional underwriting fees of B1, RF ∗1Comp and RF
∗
1Coll
, are higher than the respective weighted
average proportional underwriting fees of B2, RF ∗2Comp and RF
∗
2Coll
.
For a threshold firm, which is indifferent between its IPO being underwritten by B1 or B2, the
proportional fee is higher if its IPO is underwritten by B1 because of the higher value-added
provided by B1. The proportional fee of other (more valuable) firms underwritten by B1 is
lower than that of the threshold firm. In addition, the proportional fee of other (less valuable)
firms underwritten by B2 is higher than the proportional fee of the largest firm whose IPO is
underwritten by B2. Lemma 5 shows that the difference between equilibrium underwriting fees
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of the two banks is sufficiently large that the average proportional fee paid by firms whose values
exceed V1 =
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 and whose IPOs are underwritten by B1 exceeds the mean proportional
fee paid by firms whose values are between V2 =
λ∗2
α2
and V2 =
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 and whose IPOs are
underwritten by B2. This result is consistent with the existing evidence that both underwriter
spreads and IPO underpricing tend to be increasing in underwriter quality (e.g., Beatty and
Welch (1996) and Cliff and Denis (2004)), and with unreported tests using our data.
Overall, the fact that the results in Lemmas 4 and 5 are consistent with the empirical
evidence can be thought as partially validating the model’s setting and assumptions.
2.7 Underwriter compensation and the demand for public incorporation
2.7.1 Mass of underwritten IPOs
The first intuitive result is that in both the oligopolistic competition and collusive scenarios the
mass of IPOs underwritten by each bank, as well as the total mass of underwritten IPOs, is
increasing in the mass of firms considering going public, N .
Lemma 6 The mass of IPOs underwritten by each bank in the competitive scenario, N∗1Comp
and N∗2Comp, and in the collusive scenario, N
∗
1Coll
and N∗2Coll, for B1 and B2 respectively, are
increasing in N .
The monotonic relation between the mass of IPOs underwritten by each bank in equilibrium and
N in both the competitive and collusive scenarios is useful, because it enables us to translate
various comparative statics of the model with respect to the demand for public incorporation,
N , into empirical predictions regarding the relations between observable quantities in the IPO
market and the total number of firms going public in a particular time period. We realize,
however, that the monotonic theoretical relations between the demand for public incorporation,
N , on one hand and the total equilibrium mass of IPOs, N∗1Comp +N
∗
2Comp
and N∗1Coll +N
∗
2Coll
,
in the competitive and collusive scenarios respectively on the other hand, hold within a model
that abstracts from the possibility of obtaining public incorporation through means other than
an IPO, such as through an acquisition by a publicly-traded firm. Thus, we account for both
IPOs and acquisitions of private firms by public ones when we construct an empirical proxy for
the demand for public incorporation.
We now turn to examining the comparative statics of the equilibrium underwriting fees in
the two scenarios with respect to the demand for public incorporation, with the objective of
designing empirical tests of the implicit underwriter collusion hypothesis against the alternative
of oligopolistic competition.
17
2.7.2 Proportional underwriting fees
The relation between the two banks’ proportional fees on one hand and the demand for public
incorporation on the other hand is summarized in the following two propositions. Proposition 1
corresponds to the oligopolistic competition scenario, while Proposition 2 considers the implicit
collusion scenario.
Proposition 1 In a competitive underwriting market, the weighted average proportional fee of
the higher-quality bank (B1) and that of the lower-quality bank (B2), RF ∗1Comp and RF
∗
2Comp
respectively, are increasing in N .
This result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)
and Loughran and Ritter (2004) among many others, who find that the indirect component
of underwriter compensation, i.e. IPO underpricing, tends to be higher when the demand for
public incorporation is high. The intuition behind the positive relation between the average
proportional fees of the two banks and the demand for public incorporation in the competitive
case is as follows. While the mass of IPOs underwritten by each bank is increasing in the
mass of firms considering an IPO, N , as shown in Lemma 6, the proportion of firms that go
public and have their IPOs underwritten by a given bank out of the total mass of firms that are
considering going public is decreasing in N . The reason is that the marginal cost of underwriting
the last IPO in a given range of IPO values is increasing in N , as follows from the condition
k < 1 in the underwriting cost function in (3). The marginal revenue of the last (least valuable)
IPO in a given range of IPO values is independent of N . Thus, when N increases, leading to
an increase in the marginal cost of underwriting the last IPO in a given range of IPO values,
marginal revenue has to increase in equilibrium. Higher equilibrium marginal revenue implies
higher value of the last underwritten IPO in equilibrium and more narrow range of values of
IPOs underwritten by each of the two banks. This outcome is consistent with the prediction
of signaling models of IPOs that underwriters are more selective in choosing IPOs in hot IPO
markets (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber (1989)).
The proportional fee paid by the lowest-valued firm that the lower-quality bank (B2) under-
writes equals α2, since for that firm the bank extracts the whole surplus obtained at the time
of the IPO. As follows from Lemma 4, the proportional fee paid by a firm to a given bank is
decreasing in the IPO value; thus, the average proportional fee paid to B2 is lower than α2.
However, since the range of values of firms whose IPOs are underwritten by B2 is decreasing
in N , the average proportional fee approaches the highest proportional fee (α2) as N increases.
While the higher-quality bank (B1) does not extract the full surplus from the lowest-valued firm
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among those it underwrites (because that firm has the option of its IPO being underwritten
instead by B2), similar logic holds for B1: The higher the demand for public incorporation,
the narrower the range of values of firms underwritten by B1. This implies that B1’s average
proportional fee approaches the highest proportional fee charged by B1 as N increases.
Proposition 2 In a collusive underwriting market:
a) the weighted average proportional fee of the higher-quality bank (B1), RF ∗1Coll, is increasing
in N ;
b) the weighted average proportional fee of the lower-quality bank (B2), RF ∗2Coll, exhibits a U-
shaped relation with N : It is decreasing in N for sufficiently low N and it is increasing in N
for sufficiently high N .
The intuition behind the positive relation between the average proportional fee of the higher-
quality bank and N in the collusive scenario is similar to that in the competitive scenario: Higher
N leads to a narrower range of values of firms underwritten by the higher-quality bank, raising
its average proportional fee. The U-shaped relation between the average proportional fee of
the lower-quality bank and the demand for public incorporation in the collusive case is a little
subtler, as it is driven by a combination of two effects. First, as with the higher-quality bank,
higher N leads to a narrower range of values of firms underwritten by the lower-quality bank,
raising its average proportional fee. Second, for low levels of N , the two banks’ joint expected
profit is maximized when most IPOs are underwritten by B1. This is because if the banks’
objective is to maximize their combined profit, then for low levels of N – for which the marginal
costs of underwriting are close to zero – it is optimal to channel most IPOs to the higher-quality
bank, which can charge a higher underwriting fee. Allocating IPOs to the lower-quality bank
would reduce the mass of IPOs underwritten by the higher-quality bank and the two banks’
combined profit. To channel most of the IPOs to the higher-quality bank, the lower-quality
bank’s fee is set high.
The second (negative) effect of the demand for public incorporation on the lower-quality
bank’s fee leads to a decreasing relation between the lower-quality bank’s fee and the demand
for public incorporation when the latter is relatively low. As N continues to increase, the higher-
quality bank becomes constrained by its increasing marginal cost of underwriting, making it
optimal to allocate more IPOs to the lower-quality bank. Thus, when N is high, the incentives
to set high fees for the lower-quality bank are weaker, making the first (positive) effect of the
demand for public incorporation on the lower-quality bank’s fee dominant. The combination of
these two effects leads to the U-shaped relation between the demand for public incorporation
and the average proportional fee charged by the lower-quality underwriter.
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2.7.3 Absolute (dollar) underwriting fees
Next, we examine the relation between equilibrium absolute (dollar) fees charged by each of the
two banks and the demand for public incorporation.
Proposition 3 In a competitive underwriting market, the ratio of the absolute (dollar) fee
charged by the higher-quality bank (B1), λ
∗
1Comp
, to the fee charged by the lower-quality bank
(B2), λ
∗
2Comp
, is decreasing in N .
The intuition is as follows. When N is low, the marginal costs of both underwriters are
close to zero, and the only way for the lower-quality bank to underwrite some IPOs is to charge
a fee that is substantially lower than that of the higher-quality bank. This leads to a high
ratio of the fee of the higher-quality underwriter to that of the lower-quality underwriter. As
N increases, the range of values of IPOs underwritten by B1 narrows, increasing the residual
demand for B2’s underwriting services. This encourages B2 to charge higher underwriting fee,
leading to a lower ratio of B1’s fee to B2’s fee. As a result, the relation between the demand
for public incorporation and the ratio of the fee charged by the higher-quality bank to that of
the lower-quality bank is negative in the oligopolistic competition scenario.
Proposition 4 In a collusive underwriting market, the ratio of the absolute (dollar) fee charged
by the higher-quality bank (B1), λ
∗
1Coll
, to the fee charged by the lower-quality bank (B2), λ
∗
2Coll
,
has a hump-shaped relation with N : It is increasing in N for sufficiently low N and is decreasing
in N for sufficiently high N .
When the two banks maximize their combined expected profit, they internalize the effect
that each bank’s fee has on the demand for the other bank’s underwriting services. When N
is low, the marginal costs of underwriting are also low, and the banks are better off channeling
most IPOs to the higher-quality bank, which can charge a higher fee. Thus, when N is low,
the fee of the lower-quality bank is set relatively high in order to channel most IPOs to the
higher-quality bank. As N increases, the marginal costs of the two banks increase as well,
making channelling most IPOs to the higher-quality bank less attractive. Thus, the low-quality
bank’s fee is chosen in a way that channels more and more IPOs to it as N increases. This is
achieved by lowering the fee of B2 relative to that of B1. As N increases further, the range of
values of IPOs underwritten by both banks narrows and the effects of each bank’s fee on the
other bank’s expected profit decrease. In the extreme, when N is very high, each bank’s fee
is determined in isolation. This leads to the negative relation between the demand for public
incorporation and the ratio of the two banks’ fees – similar to the competitive scenario – for
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relatively high N , and overall to a hump-shaped relation between N and the ratio of the two
underwriters’ absolute fees in the implicit collusion scenario.
2.8 Empirical predictions
Our model shows that the relations between underwriters’ equilibrium compensation and the
demand for public incorporation depend crucially on whether the underwriters implicitly col-
lude or compete in setting underwriting fees. The comparative statics in the competitive and
collusive scenarios lead to the following empirical predictions. Propositions 1 and 2 result in
empirical predictions regarding the effects of the demand for public incorporation on the average
proportional compensation received by underwriters.
Prediction 1a (Oligopolistic competition) Weighted average proportional underwriter com-
pensation is expected to be increasing in the demand for public incorporation.
Prediction 1b (Implicit collusion) Weighted average proportional compensation of relatively
low-quality underwriters is expected to exhibit a U-shaped relation with the demand for public in-
corporation. Weighted average proportional compensation of relatively high-quality underwriters
is expected to be increasing in the demand for public incorporation.
Propositions 3 and 4 lead to empirical predictions regarding the effects of the demand for
public incorporation on the ratio of absolute (dollar) compensation received by higher-quality
underwriters to dollar compensation received by lower-quality underwriters.
Prediction 2a (Oligopolistic competition) The ratio of average absolute (dollar) com-
pensation of relatively high-quality underwriters to average absolute compensation of relatively
low-quality underwriters is expected to be decreasing in the demand for public incorporation.
Prediction 2b (Implicit collusion) The ratio of average absolute (dollar) compensation of
relatively high-quality underwriters to average compensation of relatively low-quality underwrit-
ers is expected to have a hump-shaped relation with the demand for public incorporation.
2.9 Extensions of the baseline model
Some of the assumptions of our simple model are restrictive. First, in reality there are multiple
underwriters. Therefore, in Appendix B, we show that increasing the number of underwriters
does not affect the model’s qualitative conclusions. While it is possible to solve the model
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analytically for any number of underwriters, comparative statics become prohibitively algebra-
intensive. Thus, we examine the robustness of the results in the baseline model by solving the
model for the case of three underwriters.
In addition to the cases in which all underwriters collude or all of them compete, as in
the baseline model, we examine the case of “partial collusion,” in which two highest-quality
underwriters collude in price setting, while competing with the third underwriter. It is possible
that in reality larger (higher-quality) underwriters collude among themselves but compete with
smaller (lower-quality) underwriters.4 In Appendix B, we verify that even if only the two
highest-quality banks collude, the comparative statics of underwriting fees and market shares
within the subset of the two highest-quality banks are similar to 1) those obtained in a model
in which only two banks collude, and 2) those obtained in a model in which there are three
underwriters, all of which collude.
Second, in reality, underwriting fees charged by a given bank are not constant across firms
and depend, among other factors, on IPO size. In the baseline model we assume, for analytical
tractability, that the underwriters’ only choice variable is their fixed underwriting fees. However,
this assumption implies that the total fee paid by each firm to a given underwriter is independent
of the size of its IPO. This implication is inconsistent with the empirical evidence that total
fees paid in larger IPOs tend to be higher than those paid in smaller IPOs (e.g., Chen and
Ritter (2000), Hansen (2001), and Torstila (2003)). Thus, in Appendix C we solve numerically
a model in which we allow the underwriters to choose not only fixed fees but also variable fees
that are increasing in IPO size, and show that the model’s comparative statics are robust to
this more realistic assumption.
Third, in the implicit collusion scenario we assumed that collusion takes the form of “pseudo
competition” in which the banks set their fees jointly with the goal of allocating firms to
underwriters in a way that maximizes their combined profit. Another, more extreme, form of
collusion is perfect price discrimination, under which underwriters are able to extract each firm’s
whole surplus from going public by setting firm-level fees in a way that makes only one bank a
viable option for the firm’s IPO. In Appendix D, we examine the implications of underwriters’
ability to achieve perfect price discriminations for the relations between their proportional
and absolute fees on one hand and the demand for public incorporationt on the other hand.
The comparative statics and empirical predictions following from the model of perfect price
4Bain (1951) shows that it is easier to maintain collusion when the number of colluding firms is small. Barla
(1998) demonstrates that it is harder to maintain tacit price coordination in the presence of large firm-size
asymmetry.
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discrimination are very different from those following from the model of implicit collusion in
which underwriters pseudo-compete by setting fees jointly with the goal of allocating particular
IPOs to particular underwriters.
3 Empirical tests
3.1 Data
We draw our IPO sample from the Securities Data Company (SDC) IPO database and supple-
ment it by data on IPO underwriting spreads and underwriter reputation scores, provided to us
by Jay Ritter. Following prior studies examining underwriting fees and IPO underpricing (e.g.,
Chen and Ritter (2000), Hansen (2001), and Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011)), we
exclude from our sample IPOs by banks and utilities, closed-end funds, REITs, ADRs, reverse
LBOs, unit offerings, IPOs with offer price lower than $5, and offerings that result from spinoffs.
Finally, we require that the information on underwriting spread and post-IPO first-day return
(IPO underpricing) be available.
IPOs are not the only possible way of obtaining public incorporation. An alternative is an
acquisition of a privately-held firm by a publicly-traded one. Therefore, one of the measures
of the demand for public incorporation that we construct is based not only on the number of
IPOs but also on the number of acquisitions of private firms by public ones in a given year.
We obtain our acquisitions sample from the SDC M&A database. We include in our sample
acquisitions that satisfy the following two criteria. First, we only count acquisitions of relatively
large private firms, for which an IPO would be a conceivable alternative to an acquisition by
a public firm. Specifically, in each year we only consider acquisitions in which the target value
is equal or larger to the equity value of the smallest IPO firm in that year. Second, since we
are interested in firms that actively entertain the possibility of becoming public, we restrict our
attention to acquisitions in which the merger is at least partially initiated by the target. In
particular, we only consider private targets that hired an M&A advisor prior to acquisition.
Our final sample consists of 6,917 firm-commitment IPOs by U.S. firms between 1975 and
2013 and 3,443 acquisitions satisfying the two aforementioned restrictions. Our acquisitions
sample spans years 1981 to 2013, as the coverage of M&As in SDC is sparse prior to 1981.
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics of the IPO and M&A market by calendar year.
Insert Table 1 here
The number of IPOs varies between 12 in 1975 and 603 in 1996. U.S. firms have raised more
than $600 billion (2010) dollars through IPOs during the 39 years of our sample. Annual
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CPI-adjusted IPO proceeds also vary considerably throughout our sample period, ranging from
$0.5 billion in 1977 to $57 billion in 1999. The early 1980s and the 1990s are the two hottest
periods for IPOs. The number of acquisitions of relatively large private targets that hired an
M&A advisor ranges between 27 in 1991 and 296 in 1998, while the annual value of acquisitions
ranges between 2.9 billion in 1991 to 94 billion in 2000.
The first three columns of Panel B present statistics on annual underwriting spreads and
IPO underpricing. Similar to past studies (e.g., Chen and Ritter (2000) and Hansen (2001)),
the mean underwriting spread is 7.3% and has been on a declining trajectory over the last three
decades. Mean underpricing, calculated as the percentage difference between the newly public
stock’s closing price at the first trading day and its offer price, is 15%. Mean annual underpricing
varies over time, ranging from −0.2% for 12 IPOs underwritten in 1975 to 72% for 397 IPOs
underwritten in 1999. Consistent with past studies (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and
Loughran and Ritter (2004)), underpricing tends to be positively correlated with the demand for
public incorporation: The correlation between mean annual underpricing and annual number
of IPOs is 45%. Since it is conceivable that underwriters receive indirect compensation from
IPO investors only when underpricing is positive, the next column presents weighted average
underpricing, in which we winsorize IPO-level underpricing at zero.
The next four columns of Panel A present annual IPO statistics. In particular, in a typical
year, 39% of IPOs are backed by venture capital funds, 44% of IPOs are by firms in the hi-
tech sector, 18% of IPO proceeds are secondary, and 20% of IPOs are syndicated, i.e. involve
multiple book runners. The percentage of IPOs that involve multiple book runners is increasing
over time: There are no syndicated IPOs up to year 1992, while in each of the last five years
of the sample, more than 80% of IPOs are syndicated. This finding is consistent with Hu and
Ritter (2007), who document an increasing trend in the proportion of IPOs with multiple book
runners.
The last four columns in Panel B present annual proportions of IPOs underwritten by banks
of relatively high quality. In particular, we use two measures of underwriter quality:
1) QualityCMi,t is based on the underwriter reputation score, first proposed by Carter and
Manaster (1990) and extended by Loughran and Ritter (2004). The highest score, 9, is given
to a total of 15 most reputable underwriters throughout the sample period, including Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, and Credit
Suisse. The next set of underwriters, with scores ranging from 8 to 9 includes UBS, Wells
Fargo, Smith-Barney, and Oppenheimer among others. We define banks with a reputation
score of 8 or above in a given year as high-quality underwriters, and banks with lower scores
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as low-quality underwriters. The mean number of underwriters with the score equal or higher
than 8 in a given year is 15 and the median is 14.
2) QualityMSi,t is based on Beatty and Welch (1996), who argue that banks’ past shares of the
underwriting market are related to their current quality – reputable underwriters are those that
have done more deals in the past. To smooth historical underwriting volume in a parsimonious
fashion, we follow Beatty and Welch (1996) and apply exponentially declining coefficients to
IPOs underwritten by a given bank: Qi,t =
∑t−1
τ=t−5 2
− (t−τ)
5 V oli,τ , where Qi,t is the quality
index of underwriter i in year t and V oli,τ is the volume of IPOs underwritten by bank i in year
τ . IPOs underwritten in the past year get the coefficient of 0.87, and offerings 2/3/4/5 years
old have coefficients 0.76/0.66/0.57/0.50 respectively. Underwriter i’s market share in year t
is computed as Si,t =
Qi,t∑
j Qj,t
where j indexes all underwriters active in year t. We then rank
underwriters each year by their past market shares. To be consistent with the annual number
of underwriters classified as high-quality ones based on Carter and Manaster (1990) measure,
we define underwriters having top-15 past market shares as high-quality ones and others as
low-quality ones.
In Panel C of Table 1 we report additional statistics for the variables described above.
The standard deviation of underwriting spread is about 1% and the median is exactly 7%,
consistent with the clustering pattern documented by Chen and Ritter (2000). In contrast,
there is significant variation in IPO underpricing. The standard deviation of underpricing
across 6, 917 IPOs is 39%.
Our model shows that the comparative statics of underwriter compensation with respect to
the demand for public incorporation may depend on underwriter quality. Panel D of Table 1
presents statistics on the number and volume of IPOs underwritten by banks of various quality,
as proxied by the Carter-Manaster reputation score. If an IPO had multiple book runners –
676 deals in our sample involve two to eleven book runners – we divide issue proceeds evenly by
the number of book runners and count this IPO multiple times. 27% of all underwriter-years
belong to the high-quality underwriter subsample based on the Carter and Manaster (1990)
measure. Banks with reputation scores equaling or exceeding 8 underwrite 57% of all deals in
our sample in terms of numbers and 85% in terms of value. IPOs underwritten by high-quality
banks tend to be larger: there is an almost perfect monotonic relation between underwriter
reputation score and mean value of IPO proceeds, as follows from the last column in Panel D.
This is consistent with the assortative matching result in the model and the evidence in Akkus,
Cookson and Hortacsu (2015).
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3.2 Testing the implicit collusion hypothesis versus the oligopolistic compe-
tition hypothesis
3.2.1 Testing Prediction 1
Prediction 1 concerns the relation between the weighted average proportional underwriter com-
pensation and the demand for public incorporation. Under the oligopolistic competition hy-
pothesis, this relation is expected to be positive. Under the implicit collusion hypothesis, the
relation for high-quality underwriters is expected to be positive as well, but for low-quality
underwriters the relation is expected to be U-shaped. To test these predictions, we estimate
the following regression:
Avg compi,t = α+ β1(Dem pubt ∗HQi,t) + β2(Dem pub2t ∗HQi,t)+
β3(Dem pubt ∗ LQi,t) + β4(Dem pub2t ∗ LQi,t) +
−→
θ
−−→
Xi,t + εi,t. (23)
Bank i’s proportional compensation for underwriting IPO of firm j in year t, Compi,j,t,
consists of a direct component and, possibly, an indirect one. The direct component is the
proportional underwriting fee (gross spread) paid to the underwriter by the issuing firm. We
consider a certain percentage of IPO underpricing as the indirect component of underwriter com-
pensation, following evidence that suggests that institutional investors in IPOs indirectly reward
underwriters for allocating underpriced IPO shares to them. For example, Reuter (2006) finds a
positive relation between trading commissions paid by a mutual fund family to an underwriter
and the fund family’s holdings of recent profitable IPO shares allocated by that underwriter, and
interprets this finding as consistent with underwriters profiting from discretionary allocations of
IPO shares. Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang (2007) find abnormally intensive trading in the 50
most liquid stocks before allocations of significantly underpriced IPO shares and suggest that
institutional investors trade liquid stocks to generate excessive commissions to underwriters in
order to get favorable allocations of underpriced IPO shares.
There is no consensus regarding the proportion of IPO underpricing that is captured by the
underwriters, and the estimates vary widely. Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2011) examine
the share of IPO underpricing that is returned to underwriters in the form of increased trading
commissions and estimate that on average, lead underwriter receives between 2 and 5 cents in
abnormal commission revenue for every $1 left on the table. Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang
(2007) suggest that this proportion ranges between 30% and 65%, based on the Credit Swiss
First Boston’s settlement in 2001 of a federal investigation of alleged abuses in its distribution
of IPO shares. Kang and Lowery (2014) estimate similar fraction of IPO underpricing that
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accrues to IPO underwriters within a structural model of IPO price setting.
While in the model we tread underwriting spread and the proportion of underpricing accru-
ing to underwriters together, in reality there is an important difference between the two types
of underwriter compensation. Unlike the underwriting fee, which is set in advance of an IPO,
underpricing is observed during post-IPO trading and, thus, incorporates information revealed
during the IPO process. Therefore, realized underpricing may be a biased measure of ex-ante
expected underpricing. Thus, while it is useful to include various proportions of underpricing in
a measure of overall underwriter compensation, it is also important to examine the robustness
of the results to the specification in which underwriter compensation consists of only the direct
component – IPO spread, which is not subject to measurement error. As a result, our measures
of underwriter compensation are computed as follows.
Direct&indirect compi,j,t is the combination of IPO spread and a certain proportion of IPO
underpricing, where we vary this proportion between 0% an 65%. We winsorize underpricing at
zero, as it is reasonable to assume that underwriters capture a share of IPO underpricing only
when the latter is positive. In addition, we winsorize underpricing at 195%, which corresponds
to top 1% of first-day returns.5
Avg compi,t is the weighed average proportional compensation (direct and/or indirect) of un-
derwriter i in year t, computed as the ratio of the sum of dollar underwriting spread and a
proportion of dollar underpricing of all IPOs underwritten by bank i in year t on one hand to
the sum of dollar value of underwritten IPOs by that bank in that year on the other hand.
Dem pubt is the demand for public incorporation. We use two proxies for the demand for public
incorporation. The first proxy is #IPOt ∗ 0.01, which is the annual number of IPOs in year t
multiplied by 0.01. Multiplying #IPOt by 0.01 conveniently scales regression coefficients. As
we show in Lemma 6, in the model in which an IPO is the only method of obtaining public
incorporation, the equilibrium number of underwritten IPOs is increasing in the demand for
public incorporation, i.e. in the number of firms considering going public. Our second proxy for
the demand for public incorporation accounts for the fact that an IPO is not the only method
of obtaining public incorporation. Private firms may become public after being acquired by
publicly-traded ones. This proxy is computed as (#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01, which is the annual
combined number of IPOs in year t and the number of acquisitions by public bidders of private
targets belonging to our restricted sample in year t, multiplied by 0.01.
5The results are robust to not winsorizing underpricing at zero and to winsorizing it at the top 5% level
instead of the top 1% level.
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HQi,t and LQi,t are high-quality and low-quality underwriter dummies. In particular, we define
high quality indicator variables, HQ(CM)i,t and HQ(MS)i,t that correspond to the Carter-
Manaster and Beatty-Welch measures of underwriter quality respectively. The regression in
(23) is estimated at the underwriter-year level.6
We follow Hansen (2001), Torstila (2003), and Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) in
defining the vector of control variables,
−−→
Xi,t, in (23). It includes weighted average values across
all IPOs underwritten by bank i in year t of the following variables: IPO size, measured as the
natural logarithm of the issue proceeds, i.e. of the product of the number of shares offered by
firm j in its IPO and the final offer price, winsorized at the top 1% of its distribution;7 the
percentage of secondary shares in the offering; hi-tech indicator equaling one if the issuing firm
operates in the hi-tech sector, as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004); VC indicator equaling
one if the issue is backed by a venture capital fund; and syndicate indicator that equals one if
there are multiple book runners in the issue. We estimate the regressions using OLS and cluster
standard errors at the underwriter level.
Both the implicit collusion and oligopolistic competition hypotheses predict a positive re-
lation between underwriter compensation and the demand for public incorporation for high-
quality underwriters. Thus, both hypotheses predict that: β1 > 0 and/or β2 > 0, and in
case that either β1 < 0 or β2 < 0 the relation is expected to be positive in the range of
the relevant values of the measure of the demand for public incorporation, #IPOt ∗ 0.01 or
(#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01.8 However, the two hypotheses lead to different predictions for low-
quality banks: the oligopolistic competition hypothesis predicts a positive relation between un-
derwriter compensation and the demand for public incorporation, while the implicit collusion
hypothesis predicts a U-shaped relation (β3 < 0, β4 > 0, and the inflection point of the relation,
6The specification in (23) restricts the coefficients on the control variables to be the same for high-quality and
low-quality underwriters. An alternative specification, in which we run the regression
Avg compi,t = α+ β1(Dem pubt) + β2(Dem pub
2
t ) +
−→
θ
−−→
Xi,t + εi,t,
separately for subsamples of high-quality and low-quality underwriters produces similar results.
7In computing the IPO proceeds, we follow Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) and include the over-allotment
option. If the over-allotment option is exercised, IPO proceeds and underwriter’s compensation increase. Under-
writers tend to exercise this option if the aftermarket price is higher than the offer price. We obtain from SDC
the information about whether an underwriter was given the over-allotment option (that typically equals 15% of
the shares issued in the IPO) and to what extent this option was exercised.
8In the latter case, if β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, we expect the inflection point, −β1/(2β2) to be above the highest
value of #IPOt ∗ 0.01 ((#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01), which equals 6.03 (8.22); and if β1 < 0 and β2 > 0, we expect
the inflection point to be below the lowest value of #IPOt ∗ 0.01 ((#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01), which is 0.12 (0.74).
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−β3/(2β4), within the relevant range of the independent variable: 0.12 < #IPOt ∗ 0.01 < 6.03
or 0.74 < (#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01 < 8.22).
The results of estimating (23) are reported in Table 2. Panel A reports the results in which
the measure of the demand for public incorporation is #IPOt ∗ 0.01, while Panel B presents
results in which the measure is (#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01. In the first five columns we define
high-quality underwriters according to QualityCMi,t, whereas in columns 6-10, high-quality
underwriters are defined according to QualityMSi,t.
Insert Table 2 here
In Panel A, the results for low-quality underwriters support the implicit collusion hypothesis
and are inconsistent with the competition hypothesis. The coefficients on the linear term of
the demand for public incorporation (#IPOt ∗ 0.01) ∗ LQi,t are negative and significant in
all ten specifications, while the coefficients on the quadratic term of the demand for public
incorporation, (#IPOt ∗ 0.01)2 ∗ LQi,t, are positive and highly significant in all specifications.
The inflection point in all specifications ranges between 1.56 and 2.54, which is within the
range of #IPOt ∗ 0.01 (0.12 to 6.03), and is close to the mean value of #IPOt ∗ 0.01, which
equals 1.78, suggesting a U-shaped relation between the demand for public incorporation and
the proportional compensation of low-quality underwriters.
The relations between the proportional compensation of high-quality underwriters and the
linear and quadratic terms of the demand for public incorporation are insignificant: the coeffi-
cient on the linear term, β1 is insignificantly positive in all ten specifications, while the coefficient
on the quadratic term, β2 is insignificantly negative in the regressions in which only the direct
component of underwriter compensation is considered and tends to be positive in the regressions
in which underwriter compensation accounts for a positive fraction of underpricing accruing to
underwriters. Among cases in which indirect underwriter compensation is considered, in the
only specification in which β2 is negative, the inflection point of 12.23 is above the highest value
of #IPOt ∗ 0.01 (6.03), suggesting an overall positive, albeit statistically insignificant, relation
between the proportional compensation of high-quality underwriters and the demand for public
incorporation.
The coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with past literature: average
IPO size is negatively related to proportional underwriter compensation; banks underwriting
larger proportions of secondary offerings and VC-backed offerings receive lower proportional
compensation; banks focusing on high-tech IPOs tend to receive higher average proportional
compensation; and compensation in syndicated IPOs tends to be larger ceteris paribus.
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The results in Panel B are generally consistent with those in Panel A. For low-quality
underwriters, the relation between weighted average proportional underwriter compensation
and the demand for public incorporation, proxied by the combined annual number of IPOs and
acquisitions of private firms that hired an M&A advisor, is U-shaped. The coefficients on the
linear term of (#IPOt+#Acqt)∗0.01 are negative in all ten specifications and are significant in
nine specifications out of ten. The coefficients on the quadratic term, (#IPOt+ #Acqt)
2 ∗0.01,
are positive in all ten specifications and are significant at 1% level in eight of them. The
inflection point in all specifications ranges between 1.58 and 4.59, which is inside the range of
(#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01 (0.74 to 8.22).
For high-quality underwriters, the relation between proportional underwriter compensation
and the demand for public incorporation tends to be positive. The coefficients on the linear term
of (#IPOt+#Acqt)∗0.01 are generally insignificant, but are positive in eight specifications out
of ten. The coefficients on the quadratic term are positive and significant in eight specifications.
In cases in which underwriter compensation measure includes an indirect component and the
signs of β1 and β2 are different, the inflection points, ranging between 0.07 and 0.18, are below
the lower bound of the range of (#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01, suggesting a positive relation between
high-quality underwriters’ proportional compensation and the demand for public incorporation.
Overall, the results in Table 2 tend to be consistent with the implicit collusion hypothesis, as
the relation between proportional underwriter compensation and the state of the IPO market
is U-shaped for lower-quality underwriters and tends to be positive for higher-quality banks.
3.2.2 Testing Prediction 2
Prediction 2 concerns the relation between the ratio of average absolute (dollar) compensation
received by high-quality underwriters to average absolute compensation received by low-quality
ones, on one hand, and the demand for public incorporation, on the other hand. To test this
prediction, we estimate the following regression:
log
(
Avg $Compi∈HQ,t
Avg $Compj∈LQ,t
)
= α+ β1Dem pubt + β2Dem pub
2
t +
−→
θ
−−−→
Xi,j,t + εi,j,t. (24)
The dependent variable in (24) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the following two quanti-
ties. The numerator is the weighted average dollar compensation of high-quality underwriter i
in year t, Avg $Compi∈HQ,t. It is computed as the ratio of the total underwriting fees, including
the over-allotment option, and the proportion of dollar underpricing of IPOs underwritten by
bank i in year t on one hand, to the number of IPOs underwritten by bank i in year t on the
other hand. The denominator, Avg $Compj∈LQ,t, is the weighted average dollar compensation
per IPO of low-quality underwriter j in year t, computed similarly.
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We take the logarithm of the dependent variable because of its high skewness. Similar to tests
in Table 2, Dem pubt refers to either #IPOt ∗0.01 or (#IPOt+#Acqt)∗0.01, and underwriter
quality is measured based on the underwriter’s Carter and Manaster (1990) score or Beatty
and Welch (1996) measure. The control variables are based on those in (23) and are measured
as the differences between the underwriter-year average of the respective variable for a high-
quality underwriter (e.g., logarithm of IPO proceeds) and the underwriter-year average of that
variable for a low-quality underwriter. The unit of observation in (24) is HQ-LQ underwriter
pairs, i.e. all combinations of high-quality and low-quality underwriters. The standard errors
are clustered at the level of each high-quality underwriter.
The oligopolistic competition model predicts a negative relation between the demand for
public incorporation and the ratio of high-quality underwriter’s dollar compensation to that of
low-quality underwriter, i.e. β1 < 0 and/or β2 < 0, and in case that either β1 > 0 or β2 > 0 the
relation is predicted to be negative in the relevant range of the demand for public incorporation
measure. The implicit collusion model predicts a hump-shaped relation, i.e. β1 > 0, β2 < 0,
and the inflection point of the relation, −β1/(2β2), is expected to be within the relevant range
of the demand for public incorporation. Similar to Table 2, Panel A of Table 3 presents results
of tests in which the demand for public incorporation is proxied by #IPOt ∗0.01, while in Panel
B it is proxied by (#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01.
The results of estimating (24) are presented in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 here
In Panel A, the results are consistent with the implicit collusion hypothesis and are incon-
sistent with the oligopolistic competition hypothesis. In particular, in all ten specifications,
the coefficients on #IPOt ∗ 0.01 (β1) are positive and highly significant. The coefficients on
#IPO2t ∗ 0.01 (β2) are negative in all specifications and are significant in nine cases out of ten.
In all specifications, the inflection point of the hump-shaped relation lies inside the range of
values of #IPOt ∗ 0.01 (between 0.12 and 6.03), and is closer to the upper end of the range of
#IPOt ∗ 0.01, suggesting that the relation between the ratio of compensation of high-quality
banks to that of lower-quality ones on one hand and the demand for public incorporation on
the other hand is positive for the most part and becomes negative only in relatively high states
of the IPO market. This result is inconsistent with the oligopolistic competition hypothesis,
which predicts a negative relation for all states of the IPO market.
The results in Panel B are even stronger than those in Panel A. The coefficients on #IPOt ∗
0.01 are positive and highly significant, while the coefficients on #IPO2t ∗ 0.01 are negative and
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highly significant in all specifications. The inflection point of the implied hump-shaped relation
ranges between 5.83 and 8.05, both in the range of the annual combined number of IPOs and
acquisitions of private firms.
Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 tend to be consistent with the implicit collusion
hypothesis. Notably, our results suggest that potential collusion among underwriters is unlikely
to take the form of implicit price discrimination. The reason is that a model of implicit price
discrimination results in a negative relation between the ratio of dollar compensation of high-
quality banks to that of lower-quality banks and the demand for public incorporation, as we
show in Appendix D, which is inconsistent with the empirical results in Table 3.
3.2.3 Robustness tests
This section discusses the results of various robustness tests. These results are not tabulated
for brevity and are included in the Internet Appendix.
Tests using a subsample of the largest underwriters
As mentioned above, it is conceivable that larger (higher-quality) underwriters cooperate in
setting IPO fees, while competing with smaller (lower-quality) underwriters. We show in Ap-
pendix B that the predictions of the two versions of the model hold within a subset of colluding
underwriters, even in the presence of other, non-colluding, ones. To examine this possibility
empirically, we test the predictions of the two versions of the model, while concentrating on
a sample that consists of underwriters with Carter-Manaster (1990) reputation score equal or
higher than 3 in a given year, with the idea that these banks are ex-ante more likely to cooperate
in deciding on compensation for IPO underwriting.
The results of estimating (23) for the subsample of more reputable banks are generally
consistent with those in Table 2. In particular, the coefficients on #IPOt ∗ 0.01 ∗ LQi,t are
significantly negative, and the coefficients on #IPOt ∗ 0.012 ∗ LQi,t are significantly positive,
with the inflection point of the relation ranging between 1.05 and 2.91, i.e. within the range of
#IPOt ∗0.01. The results of tests in which the measure of the demand for public incorporation
is (#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01 are generally similar.
The results of estimating the relation between the ratio of high-quality banks’ dollar com-
pensation to that of low-quality banks on one hand and the demand for public incorporation
on the other hand, as in (24), using the restricted sample of underwriters, also support the
implicit collusion hypothesis. In some cases the results are stronger than the full-sample
results reported in Table 3, as follows from the magnitudes of the positive coefficients on
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#IPOt ∗0.01 and (#IPOt+#Acqt)∗0.01 and the negative coefficients on (#IPOt ∗0.01)2 and
((#IPOt + #Acqt) ∗ 0.01)2, and are inconsistent with the oligopolistic competition hypothesis.
Tests using different measures of underwriter quality
Our cutoffs of high and low underwriter quality are arguably arbitrary. Thus, we examine
the robustness of our results to underwriter quality definitions. In particular, we define high
underwriter quality in the following alternative ways:
1) Carter-Manaster (1990) score equal or higher than 9;
2) Carter-Manaster (1990) score higher than 7;
3) Top 5 rank of Beatty and Welch (1996) lagged market share measure;
4) Top 10 rank of Beatty and Welch (1996) lagged market share measure.
The results of estimating the regressions in (23)–(24) for each of the alternative cutoffs of
underwriter quality are fully consistent with the baseline results reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Tests addressing multiple book runners in an IPO
Our model abstracts from one important feature of the underwriting market – the prevalence of
IPOs underwritten by multiple book runners, especially in recent years (see Table 1). The fact
that underwriters tend to form syndicates now much more than in the past does not necessarily
suggest that they also collude more than previously in setting IPO fees and prices. The reason is
that collusion refers to coordination across IPOs, not within a single IPO. However, syndication
may affect underwriters’ incentives to implicitly collude in setting IPO fees and prices (e.g.,
Corwin and Schultz (2005)).
We examine whether our results are driven by joint book runners in two ways. First, we
estimate the regressions in (23)–(24) within the sub-period 1975–2000. As evident from Table
1, there are almost no cases of multiple book runners in an IPO during that period. Second, we
re-estimate (23)–(24) within the full sample, while considering an IPO as a unit of observation,
i.e. treating an IPO underwritten by multiple banks as one observation. In these tests we
measure underwriter quality by the quality of the lead underwriter, i.e. the first-listed book
runner.
The results of both sets of tests are generally consistent with the baseline results in Tables 2-3
and with the implicit collusion hypothesis. In particular, the relation between the proportional
underwriter compensation and the demand for public incorporation continues to be U-shaped
for relatively low-quality underwriters, and the relation between the ratio of high-quality un-
derwriters’ total compensation to that of low-quality banks continues to be hump-shaped in all
specifications.
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Tests using a subsample with little clustering of IPO spreads
For reasons outside of our model’s scope, there is significant clustering of IPO underwriting
spreads at the 7% level. This clustering is especially prevalent among medium-sized IPOs
(between $20 million and $100 million) in the middle and later parts of our sample (years
1988-2013). To ensure that this clustering does not drive our empirical results, we re-estimate
the regressions in (23)–(24) after excluding the aforementioned subsamples. The results of
estimating (23) are somewhat weaker than the full-sample results in Table 2 (the coefficient
on the linear term of the demand for public incorporation is negative in all specifications but
tends to be insignificant), but are generally consistent with the full-sample results. The reduced
statistical significance is due, to some extent, to smaller sample size. The results of estimating
(24) are fully consistent with the full-sample results in Table 3. Overall, these results suggest
that our findings are not driven by the clustering of IPO gross spreads.
Tests accounting for information asymmetry
As discussed above, indirect compensation of underwriters, which takes the form of kickbacks
from investors in underpriced IPOs, is a substantial part of the overall underwriter compensa-
tion. In our model, indirect underwriter compensation (underpricing) and direct compensation
(IPO gross spread) are interchangeable. In reality, underpricing and underwriting spread are
set separately, and while there is significant clustering of gross spreads, the variation in IPO
underpricing is large (see Panel B of Table 1). Thus, any empirical relation between estimated
underwriter compensation and the demand for public incorporation is likely to be driven by the
relation between underpricing and the demand for public incorporation. In order to attribute
the non-monotonic relations between the proportional compensation of relatively low-quality
underwriters and the ratio of dollar compensation of higher-quality underwriters to that of
lower-quality ones on one hand and the demand for public incorporation on the other hand to
implicit collusion among underwriters, we need to ensure that these relations do not follow from
alternative theories of IPO underpricing.
Many such theories rely on the assumption of asymmetric information among issuers, un-
derwriters, and investors. Various types of asymmetric information models, such as those based
on winner’s curse (e.g., Rock (1986)), those based on information revelation during the book-
building process (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990)), those
based on agency conflicts (e.g., Baron (1982) and Biais, Bossaerts and Rochet (2002)), and those
based on signaling (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch
(1989)) imply that there is a positive relation between the uncertainty about an IPO firm val-
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uation and underpricing (e.g., Ritter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986)). To the extent that
the proportion of informed investors, who help reduce valuation uncertainty, is lower when the
demand for public incorporation is high, information-asymmetry-based models are consistent
with a positive relation between underpricing and the demand for public incorporation. 9
Thus, the asymmetric-information-based theories of IPO underpricing translate into a pre-
diction of a positive relation between underwriter’s proportional compensation and the demand
for public incorporation. This prediction is consistent with the prediction following from the
oligopolistic competition setting in our model. It does not seem to be consistent, however, with
the non-monotonic relation in the implicit collusion model and with the empirical relation doc-
umented in Table 2. However, to ensure that our results are not due to asymmetric information,
we augment our tests of Predictions 1 and 2 by the following two industry-level information
asymmetry measures: the mean number of analysts following firms in each of the Fama and
French (1997) 49 industries in a given year, and the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of
firms’ earnings, averaged within each Fama and French (1997) 49 industry in a given year. The
results of these tests are fully consistent with the baseline results reported in Tables 2 and 3.
We conclude, therefore, that these alternative models of IPO underpricing cannot explain our
empirical results,10 which supports our interpretation of the results as consistent with implicit
collusion among underwriters.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we try to shed light on an elusive question: Do IPO underwriters in the U.S. com-
pete for IPO business by setting competitive spreads and offer prices? To answer this question,
we construct two versions of a model of interaction between heterogeneous IPO underwriters
and heterogenous firms. In the first, a model of oligopolistic competition, each bank sets its
fee for underwriting services separately, with the objective of maximizing its own profit, while
9Similar predictions follow from a behavioral model of informational cascades (e.g., Welch (1992)), according
to which investors in earlier successful IPOs, which may lead to more successful future IPOs due to positive
information in the former, may demand higher compensation in the form of underpricing. Thus, the average un-
derpricing in periods in which the demand for public incorporation is high, which may coincide with informational
cascades, is likely to be higher than that in which the demand for public incorporation is low.
10Other theories of IPO underpricing, such as those based on the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis (e.g., Ibbotson
(1975)), price stabilization (e.g., Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (1996)), tax reasons (e.g., Taranto (2003)), and
corporate control (e.g., Brennan and Franks (1997)) do not seem to lead to predictions about the proportional
and absolute compensation of banks of various quality on one hand and the demand for public incorporation on
the other hand.
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accounting for the optimal response of other underwriters. In the second, a model of implicit
collusion, underwriters cooperate and set their fees with the goal of maximizing their joint
profit.
The two versions of the model generate different comparative statics and empirical predic-
tions regarding the effects of the demand for public incorporation on equilibrium compensation
of underwriters of various quality. Unlike most existing studies of the underwriting market
structure, which separately test the implications of either the implicit collusion hypothesis or
the competition hypothesis, we examine both hypotheses simultaneously. We test the contrast-
ing empirical implications of the competitive and collusive models using U.S. IPO data from
1975 to 2013. Most of our evidence lends support to the implicit collusion hypothesis and is
less consistent with the oligopolistic competition hypothesis.
Our conclusion that underwriters do not compete fiercely in IPO price setting complements
recent studies that provide indirect evidence on the lack of competition in the IPO underwriting
market. Liu and Ritter (2011) argue that by differentiating their services, e.g., providing all-
star analyst coverage, underwriters effectively mitigate the extent of price competition. Hu and
Ritter (2007) show that IPOs underwritten by multiple book runners have become increasingly
popular since the turn of the century. Syndication of book runners reduces coordination costs
and makes implicit collusion more sustainable, as it may overcome the issue of the legality of side
payments among underwriters. However, the short history of IPOs underwritten by joint book
runners limits our ability to conduct meaningful time-series empirical tests of this phenomenon.
Overall, our results demonstrate that empirical tests of predictions that follow from indus-
trial organization models of interactions among underwriters and between underwriters, issuing
firms and investors may lead to better understanding of the competitive structure of the IPO
underwriting market. While beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to examine
the model’s predictions using data from non-U.S. markets with sufficient time-series IPO data,
such as the U.K., Japan, and Canada, in order to test the claim that non-U.S. underwriting
markets are more competitive than the U.S. underwriting market (e.g., Abrahamson, Jenkinson
and Jones (2011)). In addition, our model could also be used to investigate the structure of
other markets in which heterogeneous intermediaries interact with heterogeneous firms. Exam-
ples include the market for underwriting seasoned equity offerings and the market for M&A
advising. Such analyses could shed light on whether market power of financial intermediaries
impacts the cost of intermediation and its evolution over time (e.g., Philippon (2015)).
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5 Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume first that λ1α1 >
λ2
α2
.
Then the value of a firm that is indifferent between having its IPO underwritten by B1 and
remaining private is given by
Vi(1 + α1)− λ1 = Vi ⇒ Vi = λ1
α1
. (25)
Similarly, the value of a firm that is indifferent between having its IPO underwritten by B2 and
remaining private is given by
Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 = Vi ⇒ Vi = λ2
α2
. (26)
Since λ1α1 >
λ2
α2
, a firm remains private if Vi ≤ λ2α2 .
The value of a firm that is indifferent between having its IPO underwritten by B1 and having
its IPO underwritten by B2 is given by
Vi(1 + α1)− λ1 = Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 ⇒ Vi = λ1 − λ2
α1 − α2 . (27)
Since λ1−λ2α1−α2 − λ1α1 = (λ1α1 − λ2α2 )( α2α1−α2 ) > 0, a firm chooses to have its IPO underwritten by B1
if Vi >
λ1−λ2
α1−α2 .
In the intermediate region, λ2α2 < Vi ≤ λ1−λ2α1−α2 , a firm’s IPO is underwritten by B2.
Assume now that λ1α1 ≤ λ2α2 .
It follows from (25) and (26) that a firm remains private if Vi ≤ λ1α1 .
Since λ1−λ2α1−α2 − λ2α2 = (λ1α1 − λ2α2 )( α2α1−α1 ) ≤ 0, B2 does not underwrite any IPOs, as any firm for
which Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 > Vi, Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 < Vi(1 + α1)− λ1.
Therefore, a firm performs an IPO underwritten by B1 if Vi >
λ1
α1
.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider first the case of oligopolistic competition.
Assume that in equilibrium,
λ∗1
α1
≤ λ∗2α2 . In this case, it follows from Lemma 1 that B2 does not
underwrite any IPOs and its profit is 0.
Assume that instead B2 deviates from the assumed equilibrium strategy and chooses λ2 =
λ∗1
α2
α1
− , where → 0.
Then the firm with value Vi =
λ∗1−λ2
α1−α2 would choose to have its IPO underwritten by B2. Since
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the marginal cost of underwriting the first infinitesimal unit of IPO is 0, this is a profitable
deviation.
Therefore,
λ∗1
α1
≤ λ∗2α2 is not an equilibrium; an equilibrium has to satisfy
λ∗2
α2
<
λ∗1
α1
.
Now assume that in equilibrium λ1−λ2α1−α2 ≥ 1.
Then, since Vi ≤ 1, every firm would prefer to have its IPO underwritten by B2, and B1 would
not underwrite any IPOs. A profitable deviation for B1 would be to charge λ1 = λ2+α1−α2−,
where → 0 given that the marginal cost of underwriting the first infinitesimal unit of IPOs is
zero.
Thus, in equilibrium λ∗1 would be such that
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 < 1.
Consider now the case of implicit collusion.
Assume that in equilibrium,
λ∗1
α1
≤ λ∗2α2 , such that B2 does not underwrite any IPOs.
Consider the change in the underwriters’ combined revenue from reducing λ2 and setting it
equal to λ2 = λ
∗
1
α2
α1
− , where → 0, such that B2 underwrites an infinitesimal unit of IPO.
The equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by B1 equals
N1Coll =
(
1− λ
∗
1 − λ2
α1 − α2
)
N. (28)
The equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by B2 equals
N2Coll =
(
λ∗1 − λ2
α1 − α2 −
λ2
α2
)
N. (29)
Differentiating the combined revenue of the two underwriters with respect to λ2 results in
∂ (N1Collλ1 +N2Collλ2)
∂λ2
=
λ∗1
α1 − α2+
((
− 1
α1 − α2 −
1
α2
)
λ2 +
(
λ∗1 − λ2
α1 − α2 −
λ2
α2
))
= −2λ
∗
1α2 − λ2α1
α1 − α2 .
(30)
The expression in (30) approaches zero as λ2 → λ∗1 α2α1 .
The change in underwriters combined cost as a result of B2 underwriting an infinitesimal unit
of IPO equals the difference between B1’s marginal cost of underwriting the last unit of IPO,
which equals c1
Nk
N21Coll and B1’s marginal cost of underwriting the first infinitesimal unit of
IPO, which approaches 0.
Thus, the (negative) change in the two banks’ combined revenue as a result of deviating from
the equilibrium in which B2 does not underwrite any IPOs, which approaches zero, is lower in
absolute value than the strictly negative change in the two banks’ combined underwriting cost.
In other words, the benefit of deviating from the equilibrium in which B2 does not underwrite
any IPOs is higher than the cost of such deviation. As a result, in equilibrium, both B1 and B2
underwrite positive masses of IPOs. It follows that in equilibrium
λ∗2
α2
<
λ∗1
α1
needs to be satisfied.
Simlar to the proof in the case of oligopolistic competition, if in equilibrium
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 ≥ 1 then B1
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would not underwrite any IPOs. This does not maximize the banks’ combined profit as having
B1 underwrite the first infinitesimal unit of IPO both increases the marginal revenue and re-
duces the marginal cost of that IPO. Thus, in equilibrium λ∗1 would be such that
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 < 1.
Note that the conditions
λ∗2
α2
<
λ∗1
α1
and
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 < 1 imply that the mass of IPOs underwritten by
B2 in equilibrium is
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 −
λ∗2
α2
=
λ1
α1
− λ2
α2
(α1−α2)/α1 > 0.
The rest of the proof follows from the indifference conditions (25)-(27) in the proof of Lemma
1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Subtracting the sum of the two banks’ equilibrium profits in the oligopolistic competition sce-
nario in (14) and (15), from the banks’ combined equilibrium profit in the implicit collusion
scenario in (21) results in:
pi∗jointColl − (pi∗1Comp + pi∗2Comp) =
4N3Γ1 + 4N
2+kΓ2 +N
1+2kΓ3 +N
3kΓ4
2Φ2CompΦColl
, (31)
where
Γ1 = c1c
2
2 α
4
1 + c
3
2 α
4
1 + 2c1c
2
2 α
3
1α2 + 3c
2
1c2α
2
1α
2
2 + 2c
3
1α
4
2,
Γ2 = (α1 − α2)
(
c22 α
4
1 + 2c1c2 α
3
1α2 + 3c
2
1α
3
1α2 + 6c1c2 α
2
1α
2
2 + 3c
2
1α1α
3
2 + c
2
1α
4
2
)
,
Γ3 = α2 (α1 − α2)2
(
8c2 α
3
1 + 4c1α
2
1α2 + 13c2α
2
1α2 + 16c1 α1α
2
2 + 3c1α
3
2
)
,
Γ4 = α1α
2
2 (α1 − α2)3 (4α1 + 5α2) .
Γ1, Γ2, Γ3, and Γ4 are positive. Therefore, the underwriters’ combined equilibrium profit in the
collusive scenario, pi∗jointColl , is larger than the sum of their equilibrium profits in the oligopolis-
tic competition scenario, pi∗1Comp + pi
∗
2Comp
.
Proof of Lemma 4
Under the assumption that a given bank j charges the same fee λj to all firms it underwrites,
λj
Vj
is clearly decreasing in Vi. This negative relation holds for every λj , in equilibrium or off-
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5
The difference between the equilibrium weighted average proportional compensation of B1 and
that of B2 is given by
RF ∗1 −RF ∗2 =
λ∗1
(
1− λ∗1−λ∗2α1−α2
)
∫ 1
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2
V dV
−
λ∗2
(
λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2 −
λ∗2
α2
)
∫ λ∗1−λ∗2
α1−α2
λ∗2
α2
V dV
. (32)
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In the oligopolistic competition case, plugging λ∗1Comp from (10) and λ
∗
2Comp
from (11) into (32)
results in:
RF ∗1Comp −RF ∗2Comp =
N3Ψ1 +N
2+kΨ2 +N
1+2kΨ3 +N
3kΨ4
Ψ5
, (33)
where
Ψ1 = 8c1c2α
2
1 (α1 − α2) ,
Ψ2 = 2c2α1
(
c2α1
(
3α21 − 5α1α2 + 2α22
)
+ c1α2
(
8α21 − 12α1α2 + 4α22
))
,
Ψ3 = (α1 − α2)α2
(
2c1α2
(
3α21 − 4α1α2 + α22
)
+ c2α1
(
11α21 − 15α1α2 + 4α22
))
,
Ψ4 = (α1 − α2)2 α22
(
3α21 − 5α1α2 + 2α22
)
,
Ψ5 = 2Nc1
(
2Nc2α1 +N
k (2α1 − α2)α2
)
+Nk
(
Nc2 α1 (3α1 − 2α2) +Nkα2
(
3α21 − 4α1α2 + α22
))
.
Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3, Ψ4, and Ψ5 are positive. Thus, RF ∗1Comp −RF ∗2Comp > 0.
In the implicit collusion case, plugging in λ∗1Coll from (17) and λ
∗
2Coll
from (18) into (32) results
in:
RF ∗1Coll −RF ∗2Coll =
2(N4Ψ6 +N
3+kΨ7 +N
2+2kΨ8 +N
1+3kΨ9 +N
4kΨ10)
Ψ11Ψ12
, (34)
where
Ψ6 = 8c
2
1c
2
2(α1 − α2),
Ψ7 = 2c1c2(α1 − α2)(7α2c1 + 4α1c2),
Ψ8 = (α1 − α2)
(
7c21α
2
2 + c1c2α2(17α1 − 10α2) + 3c22α21
)
,
Ψ9 = α2(α1 − α2)(c1α2(9α1 − 7α2) + 2c2α1(3α1 − 2α2)),
Ψ10 = α
2
2(3α1 − 2α2)(α1 − α2)2,
Ψ11 = 4Nc1
(
Nc2 +N
kα2
)
+ 3Nk
(
Nc2α1 +N
kα2(α1 − α2)
)
,
Ψ12 = Nc1
(
4Nc2 + 3N
kα2
)
+ 2Nk
(
Nc2α1 +N
kα2(α1 − α2)
)
.
Ψ6, Ψ7, Ψ8, Ψ9, Ψ10, Ψ11, and Ψ12 are positive. Therefore, RF ∗1Coll −RF ∗2Coll > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6
Differentiating N∗1Comp , N
∗
2Comp
, N∗1Coll , and N
∗
2Coll
in (12), (13), (19), and (20) respectively with
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respect to N results in
∂N∗1Comp
∂N
=
Nkα1
(
N3Ω1 +N
2+kΩ2 +N
1+2kΩ3 +N
3kΩ4
)
Ω25
, (35)
∂N∗2Comp
∂N
=
Nkα1α2
(
N3Ω6 +N
2+kΩ7 +N
1+2kΩ8 +N
3kΩ9
)
Ω25
, (36)
∂N∗1Coll
∂N
=
Nk
(
N3Ω10 +N
2+kΩ11 +N
1+2kΩ12 +N
3kΩ13
)
2Ω214
, (37)
∂N∗1Coll
∂N
=
N1+kc1α2
(
N2Ω15 +N
1+kΩ16 +N
2kΩ17
)
2Ω214
, (38)
where
Ω1 = 4c1c
2
2α
2
1k,
Ω2 = 2c2α1(c1α2(α2 + 4(α1 − α2)k) + c2α1(2α1 − α2)),
Ω3 = α2(α1 − α2)(2c1α2(2α1 − α2)k + c2α1(8α1 − α2(k + 2))),
Ω4 = α
2
2(α1 − α2)2(4α1 − α2),
Ω5 = 2Nc1
(
2Nc2α1 +N
kα2(2α1 − α2)
)
+Nk
(
2Nc2α1(2α1 − α2) +Nkα2
(
4α21 − 5α1α2 + α22
))
,
Ω6 = 8c
2
1c2α1k,
Ω7 = 4c1(c1α2(2α1 − α2) + c2α1(α1 + 2α1k − 2α2k)),
Ω8 = (α1 − α2)(c2α1(2α1 − α2)k + 2c1α2(α1(4− k))− α2),
Ω9 = α2(α1 − α2)2(4α1 − α2),
Ω10 = c1c
2
2α1k,
Ω11 = c2
(
c1α2(α2 + 2(α1 − α2)k) + c2α21
)
,
Ω12 = (α1 − α2)(2c2α1 + c1kα2),
Ω13 = (α1 − α2)2α22,
Ω14 = Nc1(Nc2 +N
kα2) +N
k(Nc2α1 +N
k(α1 − α2)α2),
Ω15 = c1c2k,
Ω16 = N
kc2α2 +N
kc2α1,
Ω17 = N
2kα2(α1 − α2)(2− k).
Ω1–Ω17 are all positive. Thus, the partial derivatives in (35), (36), (37), and (38) are positive.
Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating the equilibrium weighted average proportional fee of B1 in (22) in the case of
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oligopolistic competition, with respect to N results in
∂RF1Comp
∗
∂N
=
2Nkα21(1− k)
(
N2(2c1c2
(
2c1α
2
2 + c2α
2
1
)
) +N1+k(4Nkc1c2α2
(
α21 − α22
)
) +N2k((2c1 + c2)(α1 − α2)2α22)
)
2Nc1 (2Nc2α1 + α2(2Nkα1 − α2)) +Nk
(
Nc2α1(3α1 − 2α2) +Nkα2
(
3α21 − 4α1α2 + α22
)) > 0
(39)
Differentiating the equilibrium weighted average proportional fee of B2 in (22) with respect to
N results in
∂RF2Comp
∗
∂N
=
4Nkc2α
2
1α
2
2(1− k)
(4Nc2α1 +Nkα2(3α1 − 2α2))2
> 0. (40)
Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating the equilibrium weighted average proportional fee of B1 in (22) in the case of
implicit collusion, with respect to N results in
∂RF1Coll
∗
∂N
=
2Nkc1(1− k)(2N2c2
(
2c1α
2
2 + c2α
2
1
)
+ 4N1+kc2α1α2(α1 − α2) +N2k(3α1 − 2α2)(α1 − α2))(
4N2c1c2 + 4Nk+1c1α2 + 3Nk+1c2α1 + 3N2kα1α2 − 3N2kα22
)2 > 0.
(41)
Differentiating the equilibrium weighted average proportional fee of B2 in (22) with respect to
N results in
∂RF2Coll
∗
∂N
=
2Nkc1α
2
2(1− k)
(
2N2c1c2 −N2kα2(α1 − α2)
)(
4N2c1c2 + 3Nk+1c1α2 + 2Nk+1c2α1 + 2N2kα1α2 − 2N2kα22
)2 . (42)
The denominator of (42) is positive. The numerator of (42) is negative whenN <
(
α2(α1−α2)
2c1c2
) 1
2−2k
and it is positive when N >
(
α2(α1−α2)
2c1c2
) 1
2−2k
.
Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating
λ∗1Comp
λ∗2Comp
, using (10) and (11), with respect to N results in
∂
(
λ∗1Comp
λ∗2Comp
)
∂N
=
2Nα2
(
2α1c2 +N
kα2(α1 − α2)
)
4Nc2α1 + 3Nkα1α2 − 2Nkα22
> 0. (43)
Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiating
λ∗1Coll
λ∗2Coll
, using (17) and (18), with respect to N results in
∂
(
λ∗1Coll
λ∗2Coll
)
∂N
=
Nkc1(α2 − α1)(k − 1)
(
2N2c1c2 −N2kα2(α1 − α2)
)(
2N2c1c2 +Nk+1c1α2 +Nk+1c2α1 +N2kα1α2 −N2kα22
)2 . (44)
The denominator of (44) is positive. The numerator of (44) is positive whenN <
(
α2(α1−α2)
c21c2
) 1
2−2k
and it is negative when N >
(
α2(α1−α2)
c21c2
) 1
2−2k
.
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B Multiple banks
In this Appendix we relax the assumption of two underwriters. Assume that there are K
banks sorted by their quality. Assume also that banks that belong to the set C collude, while
others do not. Extending the model to the case of multiple underwriters results in the following
optimization problems of the K banks:
pij = max
λj
(
λj
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))
− cj
Nk
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))2) ∀ Bj /∈ C, (45)
pijoint = max
λj , j∈C
∑
j∈C
(
λj
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))
− cj
Nk
(
N
(
Vj − Vj
))2) , (46)
V1 =
λ1 − λ2
α1 − α2 and V1 = 1,
Vj =
λj − λj+1
αj − αj+1 and Vj =
λj−1 − λj
αj−1 − αj ∀ 1 < j < K,
VK =
λK
αK
and VK =
λK−1 − λK
αK−1 − αK .
Equation (45) describes the problem of a bank that is not part of a set of colluding banks (C),
while equation (46) describes the problem of colluding banks, whose goal is to maximize their
joint profit.
In what follows, we examine the case of three underwriters. In particular, we focus on three
scenarios:
1) all three underwriters compete (“competition”);
2) two highest-quality underwriters collude and they compete with the third underwriter (“par-
tial collusion”);
3) all three underwriters collude (“full collusion”).
Figures 1–2 present comparative statics of average proportional fees and absolute fees of the
two higher-quality banks, B1 and B2, for the three scenarios described above. The parameter
values used in Figures 1 and 2 are: α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.3, α3 = 0.1, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.1, c3 = 0.1,
k = 0.5.11 Figure 1 presents weighted average proportional fees of the top two banks: solid
lines depict the average proportional fee of B1, while dashed lines correspond to the average
proportional fee of B2. Figure 1 demonstrates that the relation between the highest-quality
bank’s average proportional fee and the demand for public incorporation is positive in the
competitive scenario and in (fully and partially) collusive scenarios. On the other hand, the
relation between the average proportional fee of the medium-quality bank exhibits a positive
relation with the demand for public incorporation in the competitive scenario and a U-shaped
11The shapes of the figures are robust to changes in parameter values.
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Figure 1: Average proportional fees: The case of three banks
Figure 1A: Competitive case Figure 1B: Partially collusive case Figure 1C: Fully collusive case
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relation in the fully and partially collusive scenarios, consistent with the baseline results for two
underwriters.
Figure 2 presents the relation between the ratio of the top two banks’ absolute (dollar) fees
under the three scenarios discussed above. It follows from Figure 2 that, similar to the two-bank
case, the relation between the ratio of the two largest banks’ absolute fees and the demand for
public incorporation is negative when these two banks compete and it exhibits a hump-shaped
relation with N when the two banks collude, regardless of whether they collude with the third
bank or compete with it. Overall, the numerical analysis in this section demonstrates that the
comparative statics in our baseline model are robust to an inclusion of an additional, third,
underwriter and, in general, are unlikely to be driven by the assumption of two underwriters.
Figure 2: Ratio of absolute fees: The case of three banks
Figure 2A: Competitive case Figure 2B: Partially collusive case Figure 2C: Fully collusive case
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C Optimal variable underwriting fees
In this Appendix we solve numerically a model in which we allow each of the two underwriters
to choose not only the fixed component of its fee, but also its variable component, i.e. we now
assume the following structure for bank j’s fee: Fi,j = λj + µjVi. For a given combination of
λ1, λ2, µ1, and µ2 we compute using fine grid (of size G = 0.01) the optimal strategy of each
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firm whose value belongs to an interval (0, 1]:
remain private if Vi(1 + α1)− λ1 − µ1Vi ≤ Vi and Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 − µ2Vi < Vi,
IPO underwritten by B1 if Vi(1 + α1)− λ1 − µ1Vi > max {Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 − µ2Vi, Vi} ,
IPO underwritten by B2 if Vi(1 + α2)− λ2 − µ2Vi ≥ max {Vi(1 + α1)− λ1 − µ1Vi, Vi} ,
and the resulting expected profits of each of the two banks, given by
pij = λjN
1/G∑
i=1
(I(i, j)G) + µjN
1/G∑
i=1
(I(i, j)iG)− cj
Nk
N 1/G∑
i=1
(I(i, j)G)
2 , (47)
where I(i, j) = 1 if an IPO of firm with value Vi = iG is underwritten by bank j and I(i, j) = 0
otherwise.
For given λ1 and µ1 we search for B2’s best response (i.e. a combination of λ2 and µ2 that
results in the highest value of pi2 in (47), λ
′
2 and µ
′
2). We then search for λ
′
1 and µ
′
1, which are
B1’s best response to λ
′
2 and µ
′
2, and we repeat this procedure until convergence. We use the
resulting equilibrium λ∗1, λ∗2, µ∗1, and µ∗2 in the competitive and collusive scenarios to compute
banks’ equilibrium underwriting fee structures.
Figures 3–4 depict comparative statics of average proportional fees and average absolute
fees of the two banks. The parameter values used in Figures 3 and 4 are: α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.3,
c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.1, k = 0.5. Figure 3 presents the two banks’ weighted average proportional fees
in the competitive and collusive scenarios. The definition of the weighted average proportional
fee in the case of variable underwriting fees has to be modified as follows:
Definition 2 Bank j’s weighted average proportional fee, RFj , equals
λj
(
N
(
Vj−Vj
))
+µjN
Vj∫
V=Vj
V dV
N
Vj∫
V=Vj
V dV
.
Figure 3 shows that similar to the base-case model in Section 2, the two banks’ average
proportional fees are increasing in the demand for public incorporation in the competitive
scenario. In the collusive scenario, on the other hand, the higher-quality bank’s average absolute
fee is increasing in N , whereas the lower-quality bank’s average absolute fee exhibits a U-shaped
relation with N .
Unlike in the base-case model in Section 2, in which the fees paid to a given underwriter
are identical for all firms, underwriting fees are now increasing in IPO size. Thus, in order to
relate the ratio of the two banks’ fees to the demand for public incorporation, we first need to
define an average absolute (dollar) fee charged by a bank:
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Figure 3: Average proportional fees: The case of optimal variable fees
Figure 3A: Competitive case Figure 3B: Collusive case
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Definition 3 Bank j’s average absolute fee, Fj, equals
λjN
(
Vj−Vj
)
+µjN
Vj∫
V=Vj
V dV
N
(
Vj−Vj
) .
Figure 4 depicts the relation between the ratio of the two banks’ average absolute (dollar)
fees and the demand for public incorporation. Similar to the base-case model in Section 2, the
ratio of the two banks’ average absolute fees is decreasing in the demand for public incorporation
in the competitive scenario and it exhibits a hump-shaped relation with the demand for public
incorporation in the collusive scenario. Overall, the results in this Appendix suggest that
introducing variable underwriting fees does not affect the qualitative comparative statics derived
in the baseline model.
Figure 4: Ratio of absolute fees: The case of optimal variable fees
Figure 4A: Competitive case Figure 4B: Collusive case
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D Perfect price discrimination
In this Appendix we solve the model of collusion that takes the form of perfect price discrimi-
nation and discuss its comparative statics and their relation to the empirical results in Section
3. The surplus from an IPO underwritten by the higher-quality bank, Viα1, is higher than the
surplus from an IPO underwritten by the lower-quality bank, Viα2. Thus, the banks’ joint profit
is maximized when the most valuable IPOs are underwritten by B1, until the point at which
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the marginal revenue of B1 equals its marginal cost of underwriting. B2 would underwrite IPOs
with the highest value among those not underwritten by B1 up to the point that its marginal
revenue equals its marginal cost of underwriting.
It follows that the marginal revenue of B1 from underwriting the N1th IPO is
MR1(N1) = α1
(
1− N1
N
)
. (48)
The marginal cost to B1 of underwriting the N1th IPOs is
MC1(N1) = 2
c1
Nk
N1. (49)
Equating MR1(N1) in (48) to MC1(N1) in (49) and solving for N1 results in the following
equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by B1:
N∗1 =
Nk+1α1
2Nc1 +Nkα1
(50)
The marginal revenue of B2 from underwriting the N2th IPO is
MR2(N1, N2) = α2
(
1− N1 +N2
N
)
. (51)
The marginal cost to B2 of underwriting the N2th IPO is
MC2(N2) = 2
c2
Nk
N2. (52)
Equating MR2(N1, N2) in (51) to MC2(N2) in (52) and solving for N2 results in the following
equilibrium mass of IPOs underwritten by B2:
N∗2 =
2Nk+2c1α2
(2Nc1 +Nkα1) (2Nc2 +Nkα2)
(53)
In the case of perfect price discrimination, the fee charged by bank j for underwriting an IPO
by a firm with value Vi equals Fi,j = Viαj and the proportional underwriting fee equals αj .
This immediately leads to the following result.
Proposition 5 Under collusion with perfect price discrimination, the average proportional un-
derwriting fee of each bank is independent of the demand for public incorporation.
The weighted average absolute fee is defined as follows:
Definition 4 Bank j’s weighted average absolute (dollar) fee, Fj equals
N
Vj∫
V=Vj
αjV dV
N
(
Vj−Vj
) , where
V1 = 1, V1 = V2 = 1− N1N , and V2 = 1− N1+N2N .
Computing the ratio of the average absolute fees of the two banks leads to the following propo-
sition.
47
Proposition 6 Under collusion with perfect price discrimination, the ratio of the weighted av-
erage absolute (dollar) fee of the higher-quality bank (B1), F1
∗
, to the weighted average absolute
fee of the lower-quality bank (B2), F2
∗
, is decreasing in N .
Proof. Differentiating F1
∗
F2
∗ with respect to N results in
∂
F ∗1
F ∗2
∂N
= −(1− k)α
2
1
(
16N3c1c
2
2 + 8N
2+kc2 (c2α1 + 2c1α2) +N
1+2kα2 (7c2α1 + 2c1α2) +N
3kα1α
2
2
)
2N3−kc21α2 (4Nc2 +N2α2)
2 < 0.
(54)
The intuition for the negative relation between the ratio of the average absolute fees on one
hand and the demand for public incorporation on the other hand is as follows. In the case of
perfect price discrimination, the average absolute fee of each bank equals the average value-
added provided by that bank. The average value-added provided by bank j depends on two
factors: this bank’s value-added parameter αj and the average size of the IPOs underwritten by
the bank. The ratio of α1 and α2 is constant. The ratio of the average IPO sizes is decreasing
in N . The reason is that the range of IPOs underwritten by each bank narrows as N increases.
In the extreme, when N is very large, both banks underwrite only the highest-valued IPOs, and
the ratio of the two banks’ fees approaches α1α2 . In the other extreme, when N is very small, it
is optimal for B1 to underwrite almost all IPOs, and B2 underwrites only the smallest IPOs.
In this case, the ratio of the average IPO sizes of the two banks as well as the ratio of the two
banks’ average absolute fees approach infinity. As a result, the ratio of the average absolute fee
of B1 and that of B2 is decreasing in N .
Propositions 5 and 6 are inconsistent with our empirical findings of a positive relation
between higher-quality bank’s proportional fee and the demand for public incorporation, a
U-shaped relation between lower-quality bank’s proportional fee and the demand for public
incorporation, and a hump-shaped relation between the ratio of higher-quality bank’s to lower-
quality bank’s absolute fees and the demand for public incorporation. This suggests that even
if underwriters implicitly collude while deciding on IPO spreads and IPO pricing, it is unlikely
that this implicit collusion takes the form of perfect price discrimination.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Panel A reports annual means of the number and value of IPOs and acquisitions of private firms by
public ones. The sample consists of 6,917 IPOs by U.S. firms during 1975-2013 and 3,743 acquisitions
during the period 1981-2013 in which a) the acquisition value equals or exceeds the lowest market value
of equity among all firms going public in the year of the acquisition, and b) the target has hired a bank
to provide merger advisory services. The source of data is Thomson Financial’s Security Data Company
and Jay Ritter. The sample of IPOs excludes non-firm-commitment offerings, unit offerings, offerings
by banks, closed-end funds, REITs, and ADRs, reverse LBOs, IPOs with offer price lower than $5, and
offerings that are part of a corporate spinoff. We also require IPOs to have information on underwriting
spread and total proceeds. # IPOs is the number of IPOs in a given year. Value IPOs (in millions of
dollars) is total annual IPO proceeds adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 2010 dollars. #
Acquisitions is the number of acquisitions in which the targets satisfy the restrictions above in a given
year. Value acquisitions (in millions of dollars) is total annual amount paid in acquisitions in which the
targets satisfy the restrictions above adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 2010 dollars.
Panel B reports annual means of IPO and underwriter characteristics. Mean IPO spread refers to
the value-weighted mean underwriter spread. Mean underpricing refers to value-weighted mean ratio of
the share price at the end of the first trading day to the offer price, minus one. Mean underpricing (> 0)
refers to value-weighted mean underpricing, where negative underpricing is replaced by 0. Prop. VC is
the proportion of IPOs backed by venture capital funds. Prop hi-tech is the proportion of IPOs in hi-tech
industries, where hi-tech is defined as in Loughran and Ritter (2004). Prop. sec. is the equally-weighted
mean proportion of secondary shares in IPOs. Prop. synd. is the proportion of IPOs underwritten by
multiple book runners. Prop. EW HQ (CM) (Prop. VW HQ (CM)) is the equally-weighted (value-
weighted) proportion of IPOs underwritten by banks with Carter-Manaster score equal to or higher than
8. Prop. EW HQ (MS) (Prop. VW HQ (MS)) is the equally-weighted (value-weighted) proportion of
IPOs underwritten by banks with top-15 time-weighed lagged market share.
Panel C presents summary statistics for the pooled sample. The variables are defined as in Panel
B.
Panel D presents summary statistics of IPO underpricing for groups of underwriters classified by their
reputation score (CM score), as in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). If
an IPO has multiple book runners, we divide its proceeds evenly by the number of book runners and
count this IPO multiple times. #underwriter-years refers to the sum over 39 years (1975–2013) of the
annual number of underwriters belonging to a CM score group. #IPO refers to the number of IPOs
underwritten by banks belonging to a given CM group. Value of IPOs refers to the sum of value of IPOs
underwritten by banks belonging to a given CM group in 2010 dollars. % (# IPOs) is the percentage of
IPOs underwritten by banks belonging to a given CM group. % (Value IPOs) is the percentage of the
total value of IPOs underwritten by banks belonging to a given CM group. Mean value IPO refers to
mean value of IPOs underwritten by banks belonging to a given CM group in 2010 dollars.
53
Panel A. # IPOs and # acquisitions – by year
Year # IPOs Value IPOs # Acq. Value # IPOs Value IPOs
acq. + acq. + acq.
1975 12 1,105
1976 27 862
1977 19 501
1978 22 718
1979 45 1,042
1980 68 2,438
1981 177 5,097 39 9,797 216 14,893
1982 67 2,159 62 12,235 129 14,394
1983 453 16,839 63 14,374 516 31,213
1984 194 3,527 63 15,272 257 18,798
1985 187 6,042 36 8,586 223 14,628
1986 349 18,614 50 12,884 399 31,498
1987 254 15,759 41 11,118 295 26,877
1988 90 4,375 45 10,942 135 15,317
1989 100 4,764 33 5,423 133 10,187
1990 102 5,285 34 5,143 136 10,428
1991 256 17,967 27 2,895 283 20,862
1992 342 23,867 57 7,926 399 31,793
1993 402 22,954 95 7,910 497 30,864
1994 342 14,617 135 14,524 477 29,141
1995 412 25,860 175 24,814 587 50,674
1996 603 39,257 219 30,262 822 69,519
1997 402 28,455 256 50,133 658 78,588
1998 236 19,354 296 64,942 532 84,296
1999 397 57,267 266 76,461 663 133,728
2000 290 43,705 272 94,135 562 137,840
2001 60 17,782 131 36,229 191 54,012
2002 49 9,161 125 23,953 174 33,114
2003 52 9,238 117 23,444 169 32,682
2004 141 24,494 155 34,344 296 58,838
2005 127 25,847 161 48,481 288 74,328
2006 127 24,715 173 92,455 300 117,170
2007 125 28,561 154 44,251 279 72,812
2008 17 23,359 78 29,551 95 52,911
2009 35 12,425 39 12,146 74 24,571
2010 80 28,602 77 24,877 157 53,479
2011 70 23,634 82 34,827 152 58,461
2012 82 28,743 110 39,729 192 68,472
2013 121 26,251 77 24,331 198 50,582
Mean 178 17,057 113 28,739 318 48,696
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Panel C. Summary statistics – IPO characteristics
Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Spread 7.40% 1.11% 0.75% 7.00% 17.00%
Underpricing 18.56% 39.36% -50.00% 7.14% 697.50%
Underpricing (> 0) 19.36% 38.86% 0.00% 7.14% 697.50%
Prop. VC 0.395 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000
Prop. hi-tech 0.456 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
Prop. secondary 0.131 0.207 0.000 0.000 1.000
Prop. mult. bookrunners 0.098 0.297 0.000 0.000 1.000
Panel D. Summary statistics – Book runners by reputation score
CM score #underwriter-years # IPOs Value IPOs % (# IPOs) % (Value IPOs) Mean value IPO
[8, 9] 590 3919 562,298 56.56% 85.36% 114.47
[7, 8) 308 809 44,818 11.67% 6.80% 50.24
[6, 7) 208 437 18,452 6.30% 2.80% 39.01
[5, 6) 331 562 16,688 8.11% 2.53% 28.97
[4, 5) 169 278 4,114 4.01% 0.62% 14.64
[3, 4) 257 382 5,673 5.51% 0.86% 14.81
[2, 3) 251 375 4,111 5.41% 0.62% 10.88
[0, 2) 112 168 2,510 2.45% 0.40% 11.81
56
Table 2. Proportional underwriter compensation, underwriter quality, and the demand for
public incorporation
This table presents estimates of regressions in (23), in which the dependent variable is weighted average annual
proportional underwriter compensation. We compute proportional underwriter compensation in a given IPO as a combi-
nation of direct compensation (underwriting spread) and indirect compensation (ranging between 0% and 65% of positive
underpricing). Weighted average proportional compensation is the ratio of the sum of compensations received by a given
bank for all IPOs it underwrote in a given year to the sum of proceeds of all IPOs it underwrote in that year. The main
independent variables are the demand for public incorporation interacted with high quality and low quality underwriter
indicators (HQ and LQ respectively), and the demand for public incorporation squared interacted with HQ and LQ. In
Panel A, the demand for public incorporation is proxied by the annual number of IPOs multiplied by 0.01, (#IPOs∗0.01).
In Panel B, the demand for public incorporation is proxied by the sum of the annual number of IPOs and the annual
number of acquisitions of private firms by public ones in which a) the acquisition value equals or exceeds the lowest
market value of equity among all firms going public in the year of the acquisition, and b) the target has hired a bank to
provide merger advisory services, ((#IPOs+ #Acq.)∗0.01). HQ (high quality) dummy is an indicator variable equalling
one if an underwriter belongs to the group of top underwriters. This group contains underwriters with Carter-Manaster
score equalling or exceeding 9 (in columns 1-5), and those with the highest 15 lagged market shares of IPO underwriting,
based on weighed $ amount of IPOs underwritten in the last 5 years (in columns 6-10). The other independent variables
are underwriter-year means of the following IPO-level variables: IPO size, which is the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds
net of underwriting spread, and including of over allotment option if exercised; Secondary, which is the proportion of
secondary shares sold by existing shareholders in an IPO; Hi-tech, which is an indicator variable equalling one for hi-
tech issuers; VC, which is an indicator variable equalling one for VC-backed IPOs; and Syndicate, which is an indicator
equalling one for IPOs with joint book runners. The regressions are performed at the underwriter-year level. Standard
errors are clustered by underwriter. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Inflection point (HQ) is computed when the
coefficients on (#IPOs ∗ 0.01) * HQ and (#IPOs ∗ 0.01)2 * HQ (in Panel A) and ((#IPOs+ #Acq.) ∗ 0.01) * HQ and
((#IPOs+ #Acq.) ∗ 0.01)2 * HQ (in Panel B) have different signs. Inflection point equals minus one half times the ratio
of the coefficient on (#IPOs ∗ 0.01) *HQ to the coefficient on (#IPOs ∗ 0.01)2 * HQ (in Panel A) and minus one half
times the ratio of the coefficient on ((#IPOs + #Acq.) ∗ 0.01) *HQ to the coefficient on ((#IPOs + #Acq.) ∗ 0.01)2 *
HQ (in Panel B). Inflection point (LQ) is computed similarly.
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Table 3. Ratio of high-quality to low-quality underwriter absolute compensation and the
demand for public incorporation
This table presents the estimates of regressions in (24), in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of the ratio of annual mean absolute (dollar) compensation of an underwriter that belongs to the high quality (HQ)
group to annual mean absolute (dollar) compensation of an underwriter that belongs to the LQ group. Mean absolute
(dollar) underwriter compensation equals the ratio of the sum of compensation received by the underwriter in a given
year to the number of IPO underwritten by that underwriter in that year. We compute absolute (dollar) underwriter
compensation as a combination of direct proportional compensation (underwriting spread) and indirect compensation
(positive underpricing multiplied by a coefficient ranging between 0% and 65%), multiplied by IPO proceeds. The main
independent variables are the demand for public incorporation and the demand for public incorporation squared. In Panel
A, the demand for public incorporation is proxied by the annual number of IPOs multiplied by 0.01, (#IPOs ∗ 0.01).
In Panel B, the demand for public incorporation is proxied by the sum of the annual number of IPOs and the annual
number of acquisitions in which a) the acquisition value equals or exceeds the lowest market value of equity among all
firms going public in the year of the acquisition, and b) the target has hired a bank to provide merger advisory services,
((#IPOs + #Acq.) ∗ 0.01). The group of high quality underwriters contains underwriters with Carter-Manaster score
equalling or exceeding 8 (in columns 1-5), and those with the highest 15 lagged market shares of IPO underwriting, based
on weighed $ amount of IPOs underwritten in the last 5 years (in columns 6-10). Other independent variables refer to
the difference between annual mean of a variable for a HQ underwriter and annual mean value of the variable for a LQ
underwriter. IPO size is the natural logarithm of IPO proceeds net of underwriting spread. Secondary is the proportion
of secondary shares in an IPO. Hi-tech is an indicator variable equalling one for hi-tech issuers. VC is an indicator
variable equalling one for VC-backed IPOs. Syndicate is an indicator equalling one for IPOs with joint book runners.
The regressions are performed at the underwriter-pair level. Standard errors are clustered by underwriter. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. Inflection point (HQ) is computed when the coefficients on #IPOs ∗ 0.01 and (#IPOs ∗ 0.01)2
(in Panel A) and (#IPOs+ #Acq.) ∗ 0.01 and ((#IPOs+ #Acq.) ∗ 0.01)2 (in Panel B) have different signs. Inflection
point equals minus one half times the ratio of the coefficient on #IPOs ∗ 0.01 to the coefficient on (#IPOs ∗ 0.01)2
(in Panel A) and minus one half times the ratio of the coefficient on ((#IPOs + #Acq.) ∗ 0.01) to the coefficient on
((#IPOs+ #Acq.) ∗ 0.01)2 (in Panel B).
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